Calibration laboratories as a regional repair center: consolidate or collocate by Mitchell, Marquita A & Pasch, John E.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1996-12
Calibration laboratories as a regional repair center:
consolidate or collocate
Mitchell, Marquita A
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/32017
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 
THESIS 
CALIBRATION LABORATORIES AS A 




Marquita A. Mitchell 
and 
Jolm E. Pasch 
December, 1996 
Lawrence R. Jones 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
" 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average I hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data 
sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information 
Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
L AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
December 1996 Master's Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE CALIBRATION LABORATORIES AS A 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
REGIONAL REPAIR CENTER: CONSOLIDATE OR COLLOCATE? 
6. AUTHOR(S) Marquita A. Mitchell and John E. Pasch 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING 
Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION 
Monterey CA 93943-5000 REPORT NUMBER 
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
II. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the integration of AIMDs Miramar and North Island, and NADEP 
North Island calibration laboratories .. The expected benefits and weaknesses or problems resulting from integratirn 
are examined. The benefits analyzed include those in the areas of manpower, training, standards reduction, 
inventory reduction, streamlining facilities, and increased productivity. The problems analyzed include increased 
transportation costs, facilities modification costs, reduced military resiliency, potential negative impact on 
customer service, and issues related to sea/shore rotation, AIS, and the internal chain of command. The thesis also 
discusses Navy organizational structure and financial management policy, and the aspects of each that make it 
difficultto implement change. The thesis concludes that consolidation is feasible and there are scale economies 
to be achieved from consolidatingthe Intermediate and Depot level calibration laboratories at NAS North Island. 
However, the finanacial management and command and control issues must be solved before the benefits of 
Regional Maintenance can be realized. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS 
Regional Maintenance Regional Repair Center 
Consolidation Collocation 
Aviation Maintenance 
17. SECURITY CLASSIFI- 18. SECURITY CLASSIFI-




15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 164 
16. PRICE CODE 
SECURITY CLASSIFICA- 20. LIMITATION OF 




Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 298-102 
ii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
CALIBRATION LABORATORIES AS A REGIONAL REPAIR CENTER: 
Authors: 
Approved by: 
CONSOLIDATE OR COLLOCATE? 
Marquita A. Mitchell 
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy 
B.S., Alabama A&M University, 1984 
John E. Pasch 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.S., University of North Carolina at Wilmington, 1986 
Submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Gordon E. Louvau, Associate Advisor 




The purpose of this thesis is to examine the integration of AIMDs Miramar 
and North Island, and NADEP North Island calibration laboratories. The expected 
benefits and weaknesses or problems resulting from integration are examined. The 
benefits analyzed include those in the areas of manpower, training, standards 
reduction, inventory reduction, streamlining facilities, and increased productivity. 
The problems analyzed include increased transportation costs, facilities modification 
costs, reduced military resiliency, potential negative impact on customer service, and 
issues related to sea/shore rotation, AIS, and the internal chain of command. The 
thesis also discusses Navy organizational structure and financial management policy, 
and the aspects of each that make it difficult to implement change. The thesis 
concludes that consolidation is feasible and there are scale economies to be achieved 
from consolidating the Intermediate and Depot level calibration laboratories at NAS 
North Island. However, the financial management and command and control issues 
must be solved before the benefits of Regional Maintenance can be realized. 
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In his 1992 State of the Union Address, President George Bush announced 
that his FY -93 budget submission would cut fifty billion dollars from the 
Department of Defense. In an effort to continue with decreasing spending, 
President Bill Ointon announced, during the National Performance Review 
(NPR), a six month review of the federal government and asked Vice President 
Gore to lead the effort President Ointon stated, "Our goal is to make the entire 
federal government both less expensive and more efficient, and to change the 
culture of our national bureaucracy away from complacency and entitlements 
toward initiative and empowerment. We intend to redesign, to reinvent, and to 
reinvigorate the entire national government." Doing more with less is the 
primary goal. 
In response to the NPR, the Navy commenced a major initiative to save 
money and become more efficient by streamlining its industrial infrastructure. 
One area which the Navy felt it could conserve funds is in the consolidation of 
duplicate maintenance capabilities. Consolidation is the process of combining 
these duplicate capabilities and placing them under the control of a single 
maintenance facility. If properly done, consolidation can result in cost savings 
by reducing manpower, equipment, and spares inventories, yet not have an 
adverse impact on fleet support 
B. BACKGROUND 
Historically, Naval maintenance policy was formulated within platform 
lines and warfare areas. As each new weapons system was fielded, either new 
maintenance support would be introduced or the existing maintenance support 
infrastructure within the warfare area would be modified to meet the needs of 
the new systems. Existing maintenance capability and capacity in other warfare 
areas and whether they could act in support of common maintenance functions 
have not always been considered. Recognition of this area for potential 
improvement in the way the Navy does business led to a new vision for the 
future of Navy maintenance. This vision of the future includes optimization of 
maintenance processes. This vision is built upon the Battle Force Intermediate 
Maintenance Activity (BFIMA) concept, which has been used afloat The BFIMA 
concept takes advantage of the significant maintenance capability and capacity 
resident within the aircraft carrier Engineering and Aviation Intermediate 
Maintenance Departments, to provide enhanced support to accompanying ships 
and their embarked aircraft. The Maintenance Support Quality Management 
Board (MS QMB) sought to duplicate this successful example of common 
maintenance process execution afloat with a mirrored process ashore to optimize 
maintenance support at lower cost and enhanced self-sufficiency at the same 
time. It was the success of this initiative that gave birth to the Regional 
Maintenance Concept ashore. This concept has led to the consolidation of repair 
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facilities into Regional Repair Centers (RRq in order to minimize redundant 
maintenance capabilities and excess capacity. 
At the inception of the Regional Maintenance effort there were over thirty 
calibration laboratories in the Southwest Region. Reductions in ships and 
aircraft requiring support resulted in all calibration laboratories having excess 
capacity. An analysis of the southwest region to determine the optimum 
calibration laboratory posture revealed potential savings in personnel reductions 
and acquisition and maintenance of calibration standards. The Calibration RRC 
Evaluation Process Action Team recommended consolidation from thirty-three 
to six calibration laboratories. 
C. OBJECTIVE 
Efforts to consolidate aviation intermediate and depot level calibration 
labs at North Island have been unsuccessful. Although they have been co-
located they are not working as a unit thus not combined into an Regional 
Repair Center. One of the main barriers to their integration is the differences in 
accounting systems and funding sources; depot is a Defense Business Operation 
Fund (DBOF) activity and is funded by Naval Aviation Systems Command 
(NAV AIR) while Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD) North 
Island is not a DBOF activity and receives funding from AIRP A C. Additionally, 
neither activity is willing to give-up any of their "turf'. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the integration of the AIMD 
Miramar and North Island, and Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP) North Island 
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calibration laboratories. In doing so the authors will identify any benefits, 
drawbacks, barriers and other issues involved with consolidation of the 
calibration laboratories. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Primary Research Question: Under the Regional Maintenance Concept, 
what are benefits and drawbacks currently realized by collocating versus 
consolidating the calibration laboratories in the Southwest United States Region? 
Subsidiary Questions: 
• Is consolidation beneficial or detrimental to mission readiness; 
responsiveness, quality and costs? 
• What are the issues involved with the accounting system 
incompatibility and platform oriented programming and budget 
process. 
• How do manpower requirements affect consolidation and collocation 
and of calibration laboratories? 
• What affects does consolidation of Intermediate and Depot calibration 
laboratories have on other activities and facilities in the region? 
E. SCOPE 
This thesis will focus on the integration of Intermediate and Depot level 
calibration laboratories from Miramar and North Island, California. First, an 
overview of aviation maintenance, the regional maintenance concept and 
regional repair centers will be provided. Next, the affects of consolidation will 
be explored with an emphasis on risks, benefits, mission readiness, 
responsiveness, quality, and costs. Third, issues concerning full consolidation 
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the I- and D-level calibration laboratories and implementation of Regional 
Maintenance will be discussed. 
F. ME1HODOLOGY 
This thesis will rely on relevant published sources and personal 
interviews for historical and organizational data. Logistics, accounting data, and 
ramifications of consolidation will be assessed by analyzing quality analysis 
reports, interviews with key personnel to include: production control, quality 
analysis, regional maintenance working group (RM WG), calibration technicians, 
type commander comptrollers, and decision making personnel at NA V AIR and 
the Pentagon. Further analysis of the affects of consolidation in regards to 
responsiveness, mission readiness, quality and costs will be accomplished using 
a combination of linear programming, spreadsheets, and simulation models. 
G. ORGANIZATION 
The thesis is organized as follows: 
• Chapter I is the Introduction. 
• Chapter TI provides a brief overview of the Naval Aviation 
Maintenance Program. 
• Chapter Ill describes in detail the Aircraft Intermediate Level 
Maintenance. 
• Chapter N describes in detail Depot Level Maintenance. 
• Chapter V gives the history and background of the Regional 
Maintenance Concept (RMS), and describes the Southwest Region as it 
applies to RMC. 
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• Chapter VI provides benefits and drawbacks of consolidating and 
collocating. 
• Chapter VII discusses the issues that are making it difficult to establish 
the North Island calibration laboratories as a Regional Repair Center 
and the barriers to implementation of Regional Maintenance 
throughout the Navy. 
• Chapter VIII discusses findings, conclusions and recommendations for 
further research. 
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TI. THE NAVAL AVIATION MAINTENANCE PROGRAM 
A. NAVAL AVIATION MAINTENANCE PIDLOSOPHY 
The Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP) is promulgated by 
the Chief of Naval Operations via the six volume series OPNAV Instruction 
4790.2F. Set forth in this instruction is the CNO' s policies, objectives, guidance 
and doctrine. The objective of the NAMP is to " ... achieve and continually upgrade 
the readiness and safety standards, ... ,with optimum use of manpawer, facilities, material 
and funds." The objective encompasses the maintenance, manufacture, and 
calibration of aeronautical equipment and material at the level of maintenance 
which will ensure optimal economic use of resources. [Ref. 1] The intent of the 
NAMP is to establish a program of "performance improvement" through 
teamwork, communication, and efficient use of resources focused to meet the 
needs of the customer. 
B. THE THREE LEVEL MAINTENANCE CONCEPT 
1. System Maintenance Concept 
The maintenance concept describes the overall system support 
environment and sets the baseline for determining specific logistic support 
requirements. The main purposes of the maintenance concept is to provide (1) 
the basis for the establishment of supportability requirements in system design; 
(2) the total logistics support requirements; and (3) a basis for the maintenance 
plan [Ref. 2]. The Navy's aviation maintenance concept is defined in the Naval 
Aviation Maintenance Program Instruction, OPNAV Instruction4790.2F. 
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The NAMP is established upon the three-level maintenance concept The 
three levels of aeronautical repair are organizational (0-), intermediate (I-) and 
depot (D-) level and can be thought of as a pyramidal hierarchy. This concept of 
three level maintenance seeks to reduce total costs, increase operational 
readiness and availability, increase supply responsiveness, and improve 
mobilization, deployability, preparedness and sustainability. The division of 
maintenance into three levels allows management to: [Ref. 1] 
• Oassify maintenance functions by levels 
• Assign responsibility for maintenance functions to a specific level 
• Assign maintenance tasks consistent with the complexity, depth, 
scope, and range of work to be performed 
• Accomplish any particular maintenance task or support service at a 
level which ensures optimum economic use of resources 
• Collect, analyze, and use data to assist all levels of NAMP 
management 
Organizational level maintenance is at the base of the pyramidal 
hierarchy encompassing on-aircraft type work (generalized maintenance). 
Depot level maintenance is at the top of the pyramid with fewer sites performing 
specialized tasks. The top two levels of maintenance exists solely to support 
their customers, the organizations at the bottom of the pyramid. The three levels 
of maintenance are discussed in the following sections. 
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2 Organizational Level Maintenance 
0-level aircraft maintenance is performed at the operational site and 
directly supports squadron operations. Their mission is to maintain assigned 
aircraft and aeronautical equipment in a full mission capable status while 
continually improving the local maintenance process. [Ref. 1] The 
organizational repair level is often thought of as the lowest and simplest level of 





• Incorporation of technical directives (TDs) 
• On-equipment corrective and preventive maintenance. (Including 
repairf removalf and replacement of defective components.) 
• Age exploration (AE) of aircraft and equipment under reliability 
centered maintenance (RCM) 
• Record keeping and reports preparation 
3. Intermediate Level Maintenance 
I-level maintenance is at the middle of the pyramidal hierarchy. It 
provides both direct and indirect (on and off equipment material) support for 
user activities at the 0-level. The goal of I-level maintenance facilities is to 
provide high qualityf timely support to enhance and sustain the mission 
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capability and readiness of supported units with the lowest practical 
expenditure of scarce resources. Maintenance personnel at the I-level usually 
have higher skills and are responsible for performing more detailed maintenance 
utilizing a more extensive range of specialized equipment than personnel at the 
0-level. I-level functions listed in the NAMP include: 
• Performance of maintenance on aeronautical components and related 
support equipment 
• Performance of calibration (Type N), by field calibration activities 
which perform I-level calibration of designated equipment 
• Incorporation of technical directives 
• Processing aircraft components from stricken aircraft 
• Manufacture of selected aeronautical components, liquids, and gases 
• Performance of on-aircraft maintenance when required 
• AE of aircraft and equipment under RCM 
• Providing technical assistance to supported units 
Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Departments (AIMDs) ashore and afloat 
provide I-level maintenance support AIMD calibration laboratories are part of 
the primary focus of this thesis and are discussed in greater detail in Chapter ill. 
4. Depot Level Maintenance 
D-level maintenance is the highest level on the pyramidal hierarchy and 
supports the accomplishment of tasks above and beyond the capabilities 
available at the 0- and !-levels. D-level' s primary goal is to ensure the continued 
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flying integrity and safety of airframes and related flight systems throughout 
their service life. D-level maintenance supports 0- and I-level activities by 
performing major rework j overhaul of parts, assemblies, subassemblies and end 
items, as well as manufacturing parts, making modifications, testing, inspecting, 
sampling, and reclamation. Although D-level maintenance is generally 
performed by Naval Aviation Depots (NADEPs) or on-site by NADEP field 
teams, an increasing amount of work is contracted out to other Department of 
Defense (DoD) services and private industry. D-level activities have far more 
higher skills and extensive facilities than activities at lower levels, and are not 
necessarily located near the activities they support D-level maintenance 
functions listed may be grouped as follows: [Ref. 1] 
• Technical and engineering assistance by field teams 
• Standard D-level maintenance of aircraft 
• Rework and repair of engines, components, and SE 
• Calibration by Navy calibration laboratories (Type lli) as well as 
standards laboratories (Types I and II) 
• Incorporation of technical directives 
• Modification of aircraft, engines, and SE 
• Manufacture or modification of parts or kits 
• AE of aircraft and equipment under RCM 
NADEP calibration laboratories is the other area of primary focus in this thesis, 
and is discussed in greater detail in Chapter N. 
11 
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ill. OVERVIEW OF THE AIRCRAFT INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE 
DEPARTMENT (AIMD) 
A. RESPONSIBILffiES 
The AIMD is responsible for performing I-level maintenance functions on 
the aircraft and the aeronautical equipment located at the host Naval Air Station. 
These functions consists of indirect support provided by repair of not-ready-for-
issue (NRFI) items and direct support functions such as repair and return of 
components sent to an AIMD by a squadron. The I-level maintenance mission is 
to enhance and sustain the combat readiness and mission capability of supported 
activities by providing quality and timely material support at the nearest 
location with the lowest practical resource expenditure. [Ref. 1] 
B. ORGANIZATION 
The NAMP requires the same structure and organization for all AIMDs 
regardless of their location or the type(s) of aircraft they support. The goal for 
this standardization is effective management within a common framework of 
authority, functions and relationships. This allows achievement of 
improvements in performance, economy of operation, and quality of work. [Ref. 
1) Figure 3.1 represents the standard AIMD organization as set forth in the 
NAMP. 
1. Production Control 
Production Control is a staff function that has as its purpose the effective 
and efficient management of AIMD resources. Production Control acts as the 
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main interface between the supported activities and the work centers. This is 
accomplished by Production Control scheduling the workload according to 
priorities. They also act as the interface between the AIMD and the Air Station's 
Supply Department 
Power Plants 
[Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Ollicer J 
J ! Assistant Aircraft Intermediate J 
Maintenance Officer 
I Quality Assurance J l Maintenance/Material J I Administration II Manpovver, Personnel & I Control Training Coordinator I Material Control ~ H Production Control 
j Supply Department f·l 
J I Airframes II Avionics II Armament ll Aviation Life t II Support Equipment Equipment Support Equipment 
1-Level Maintenance Department Organization (ASHORE) 
Figure 3.1 
2. Material Control 
Material Control centers are contact points within AIMD organizations 
where requirements for material are coordinated with the Aviation Supply 
Department [Ref. 1]. This is achieved by forwarding requisitions for parts and 
material to supply in a timely manner. After receipt of these items from supply, 
Material Control expeditiously routes them to the applicable work centers. 
3. Quality Assurance (QA) 
Quality Assurance is a relatively small group of highly skilled personnel. 
Their primary goal is the prevention of the occurrence of defects. In addition, 
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QA provides a systematic and efficient method for gathering, analyzing, and 
maintaining information on the quality characteristics of products, the source 
and nature of defects, and their immediate impact on the current operation. The 
objective is to readily pinpoint problem areas [Ref. 1]. QA also maintains the 
Central Technical Publications Library (CTPL) for the department, which serves 
as the source for current technical information used for repairs and training. 
QA' s Data Analyst is responsible for providing quantitative and qualitative 
analytical information to maintenance managers. The Data Analyst also collects 
and screens for accuracy of all Maintenance Data System (MDS) source 
documents. 
4. Avionics 
Avionics is comprised of numerous work centers and is typically the 
largest division in AIMD. Avionics is responsible for repairing aircraft 
communications, navigation, computer, electrical, radar, sonar, weapons control 
systems, and other aircraft electronic systems. Additionally, Avionics operates 
the Precision Measuring Equipment (PME) Calibration Branch, which calibrates 
and repairs test and measuring equipment, the area this thesis focuses on. [Ref. 
1] 
5. Power Plants 
Power Plants is tasked with repairing and inspecting aircraft engines, 
auxiliary power units (APU), and engine accessories and components. Power 
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Plants is also responsible for maintaining and operating engine test facilities. 
[Ref. 1] 
6. Airframes 
Airframes consists of several interrelated work centers, each providing a 
different type of aircraft structural repair or maintenance. Airframes commonly 
have the following branches: Structures; Hydraulic/Pneumatic; Brakes; 
Tire/Wheel; Non-Destructive Inspection; Paint; and Machine Shop. [Ref. 1] 
7. Armament 
Armament maintains and repairs airborne weapon systems, such as guns, 
rocket launchers and bomb racks. Maintenance includes an active corrosion 
treatment and prevention program, performing periodic inspections, and 
preserving and storing weapons. 
8. Aviation Life Support Systems (ALSS) 
ALSS maintains aircrew personal survival and life support equipment, 
and aircraft egress systems. ALSS maintenance includes equipment repair, 
treatment and prevention of corrosion and periodic inspections. [Ref. 1] 
9. Support Equipment (SE) 
Support Equipment is responsible for maintenance and inventory control 
of non-avionics support equipment primarily used by organizational activities. 
SE can be divided into two broad categories: 1) Common Support Equipment 
(CSE), which is general purpose support equipment such as towing or mobile 
power equipment used on a variety of different aircraft types; and 2) Peculiar 
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Support Equipment (PSE) specifically designed and developed for a particular 
weapons system. SE is also responsible for training and licensing personnel in 
the care and use of support equipment. [Ref. 1] 
C. PRECISION MEASURING EQUIPMENT (PME) / CALffiRATION 
LABORATORY 
The PME work center is responsible for managing and performing 
calibration and repair on selected test and monitoring systems (TAMS) [Ref. 1]. 
Calibration of all TAMS used for quantitative measurements is mandatory and 
shall be performed according to the intervals and procedures listed in the 
current issue of reference NA VSEA OD 45845, Metrology Requirements List or 
as otherwise specified. TAMS not used for quantitative measurements shall be 
specifically labeled "Calibration Not required." Calibration and TAMS repair 
support, beyond the intermediate level responsibility, should be obtained at the 
nearest calibration laboratory consistent with good management and fiscal 
practices [Ref. 3]. Approximately 100 I-level activities have been authorized to 
perform I-level calibration of SE/TAMS. IMAs are designated as a Type N 
Field Calibration Activity (FCA). The Navy primary standards laboratory (Type 
I) and approximately 30 Type ill Navy's calibration laboratories are considered 
to be D-level facilities. IMA Calibration Laboratory responsibilities include: 
[Ref. 1]. 
• Maintain an inventory of I-level calibration standards as prescribed by 
the MEASURE User's Manual. Special attention shall be given to new 
or recently received items which may not have been previously 
reported. Items shall be removed from an activity's inventory 
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whenever custodial responsibilities change and with TYCOM 
approval. 
• Perform SE/TAMS calibration at established intervals and affix 
applicable labels and tags. 
• Calibrate SEJTAMS using I-level calibration standards. 
• Document all calibration and repair actions performed. 
• Forward SE/TAMS scheduled for induction into Type III laboratories 
and above to the designated laboratory by the calibration coordinator. 
• Ensure personnel performing calibrations are qualified and trained. 
• Ensure I-level calibration standards are submitted for calibration per 
intervals established by NA 17-35MTL-1. 
D. TRAINING 
Maintenance training is a vital element in naval aviation. The quality and 
availability of technical training determines the functional capabilities of 
operating forces and support activities. The Maintenance Training Program is 
designed to ensure basic, intermediate, advanced, and in-depth levels of training 
are provided to all maintenance personnel to support existing, planned, and 
future weapon system acquisitions. Training is provided to all Department of 
the Navy (DON) personnel to operate, maintain, and support aircraft weapon 
systems and related equipment [Ref. 1 ]. 
Maintenance training is a continuum throughout an individual's career 
which begins with entry into service and continues through various training 
courses, including Practical Job Training (PJT) where feasible, with eventual 
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assignment to a particular job. The technical knowledge and skills required to 
perform in the assigned job determine course requirements. [Ref. 1] 
Training is accomplished in a sequential process with basic courses 
providing requisites for following courses. Most aviation personnel receive 
initial training enroute to their first duty station [Ref. 1]. This initial training is 
conducted at Oass A School C A" School), and provides the basic technical 
knowledge and skill to prepare an individual for entry level performance on the 
job and for additional specialized training. Specialized training to qualify 
personnel for specific maintenance tasks is attained through Oass C Schools 
("C' School), PJT, the Maintenance Training Improvement Program (MTIP), 
formal instruction at local Fleet Readiness Aviation Personnel Departments 
(FRAMPS), Naval Aviation Training Group Detachments (NAMTRAGRUDETs), 
Fleet Aviation Specialized Training Groups (FASOTRGRUs), Naval Aviation 
Depots (NADEPs), and factory training. 
Some training qualifies technicians for a Navy Enlisted Oassification 
(NEQ, which is a code to identify personnel qualified in specific areas f tasks. 
NAVPERS Manual 18068, Volume IT lists all NECs and qualification 
requirements. 
The Aviation Maintenance Training Program provides a tailored training 
sequence. Oose liaison is established between the Maintenance Training Unit 
(MTU) coordinator and the ultimate duty station for enroute trainees to ensure 
the correct training is given for the billet to be filled. Standard billet training 
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requirements are provided by the MTU, with revised or exceptional 
requirements met on an as needed basis. The MTU sends a report of planned 
training to the members ultimate duty station. The squadron/ unit reviews the 
report to ensure planned training is consistent with requirements and unit's 
Activity Manpower Document (AMD). Concurrence/ recommended changes are 
then immediately provided to the MTU, ensuring a carefully controlled training 
program, tailored to meet fleet requirements. [Ref. 1] 
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IV. OVERVIEW OF DEPOT LEVEL MAINTENANCE 
The focus of this chapter will be on the Naval Aviation Depot 
Maintenance Organization (NADEP). The functional and program management 
structural composition will be discussed and the responsibilities of and upper 
management through lower level divisions will be described. Due to the 
breadth and depth of the organization, descriptions will be brief, focusing on 
only the main functional and program entities. Because calibration laboratories 
are the primary focus of this thesis, more attention will be given to describing 
how and where they fit into the Depot Organization. 
A. SCOPE AND MANAGEMENT OF NADEP MAINTENANCE 
NADEP maintenance consists of rework of existing aviation material, 
manufacture of items not available, and support services such as engineering, 
technology, and calibration. D-level supports organizational (0-) and 
intermediate (1-) levels by providing technical help and performing maintenance 
that are beyond the responsibility and capability of 0- and 1- level activities 
through the use of more extensive facilities, skills, and materials. 
OPNA VINST 4790.2F, the NAMP, is the primary source of guidance for 
facilities performing depot level maintenance on naval aircraft, weapon systems 
and associated support equipment The following is summarized from pertinent 
areas of the NAMP to provide a basic understanding of the mission and 
organizational structure of NADEPs. 
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has the overall responsibility 
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to establish the DoD D-level Industrial Program policy and to delegate to the 
DoD components. Within the Department of the Navy (DON) the Secretary of 
the Navy (SECNA V) has the responsibility to carry out the requirements of DoD 
policy under instructions issued by the OSD. The Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) implements the D-Level Industrial Program as directed by the SECNAV. 
The Commander Naval Aviation Systems Command (COMNAVAIRSYSCOM), 
an echelon two command, is responsible to the CNO for the overall management 
of the Aviation Depot Level Industrial Program. COMNAVAIRSYSCOM retains 
the authority to approve or disapprove recommendations for continuance, 
discontinuance, or conversion of depots in the areas of rework, manufacture, and 
extension of contract support for reasons other than cost reduction in those same 
areas. 
Under the guidance of the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), 
COMNA V AIRSYSCOM is responsible for the establishing the Metrology and 
Calibration Program (METCAL) policy. In doing so, they must budget for 
resource requirements and maintain the minimum number of calibration 
installations necessary to ensure adequate capability and capacity to meet 
operational requirements of the naval aviation community. 
The Naval Aviation Depot Operations Center 
(NAV A VNDEPOTOPSCEN) is an echelon three command under 
COMNA V AIRSYSCOM and executes depot level programs, providing depot 
level resource management support to COMNAV AIRSYSCOM. The Naval 
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Aviation Maintenance Office (NAV AVNMAINTOFF) is an echelon three 
command responsible to COMNAV AIRSYSCOM. The mission of 
NA VA VNMAINTOFF is to ensure optimum aviation maintenance performance 
and fleet readiness by coordinating aviation fleet maintenance support and 
providing technical support in aviation life cycle logistics and maintenance 
planning. The last level in the responsibility hierarchy rests with the NADEPs. 
NADEPs are echelon 3 commands under COMNAV AIRSYSCOM, whose 
primary objective is to maintain and operate facilities for and perform a 
complete range of depot level support and rework operations on designated 
weapons systems, accessories, and equipment. 
B. DON D-LEVEL INDUSTRIAL FACILffiES 
The three DoN D-Level Industrial Facilities are the Naval Air Systems 
Command (NA VAIR) principal in-service logistic support activities. NADEPs 
fulfill Program Management and Cognizant Field Activity (CF A) responsibilities 
in addition to providing industrial maintenance and engineering functions in 
support of the operating fleet Since 1989, as a result of the uright-sizing" 
initiative and tightening of the DoD budget, the DoN D-Level Industrial 
Facilities is striving to streamline production and management efforts to 
eliminate redundancies and reduce overhead costs. The three NADEPs that 
makeup Navy organic D-Level industrial base are located at North Island, 
California, Jacksonville, Florida, and Cherry Point, North Carolina. 
The NADEP functional organization and responsibilities is described in 
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Appendix A. 
C. PRODUCITON PLANNING AND WORKLOAD 
1. Depot Level Industrial Workload Definition 
Depot Level indushial workload consists primarily of indushial functions 
described in the Navy Indushial Fund {NIF) Handbook for Naval Air Rework 
Facilities, NA VSO P-3048, and other pertinent COMNA V AIRSYSCOM and 
NA VA VNDEPOTOPSCEN instructions. D-level maintenance is normally 
performed by naval organic, other military services, or commercial contractor 
aviation depots. 
The industrial workload is composed of seven major programs primarily 
associated with the specific logistic support of naval aviation operating forces, 
and various minor workload pro~ams of general to specific nature. The 
workload programs include but are not limited to the following: 
• Rework of aircraft airframes and those systems not physically 
removed from the aircraft 
• Rework of missile guidance and control systems 
• Rework of power plants 
• Rework of removed aviation components 
• Aircraft support services which include the following major 
subprograms: 
a) Salvage 
b) Preservation and depreservation 
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c) Customer/ operating forces training 
d) Aircraft acceptance and transfer 
e) Calibration 
f) Customer service 
g) COMNAV AIRSYSCOM shipboard work 
h) Support equipment (SE) 
i) Product Support Directorate (PSD) services 
• Manufacture of designated items and particular modification change 
kits for aircraft and aeronautical equipment 
• Aircraft modification 
Workload requirements are generated within the framework of the 
Integrated Logistics Support Program Requirements for Aeronautical Systems 
and Equipment, the NA V AIR Maintenance Plan Program, and other associated 
COMNA V AIRSYSCOM instructions as the basis for the determination of overall 
logistic requirements. Current and projected approved force level and approved 
flying hour program for the Navy are the primary driving factors on the 
workload requirements. These account for peacetime requirements and do not 




D. METROLOGY AND CALIBRATION PROGRAM (METCAL) 
1. Definition 
Metrology is the science of measurement or determination of conformance 
to technical requirements, including the development of standards and systems 
for absolute and relative measurements. Calibration is the process by which 
calibration installations compare a calibration standard, precision measuring 
equipment (PME), or Test and Monitoring Systems (TAMS) with a standard of 
higher accuracy to ensure the former is within specified limits. A calibration 
facility is an installation that provides calibration services for PME, TAMS, and 
calibration standards used by activities engaged in research, development, test 
and evaluation, production, quality assurance, maintenance, supply, and 
operation of weapon systems, equipment and other DoD material. PME/TAMS 
used for quantitative measurement in the Navy METCAL Program, including 
calibration standards, must be periodically calibrated to be within specified 
accuracy limits required by supported systems and equipment 
Calibration laboratories are classified as Type I, II, III, or N. Calibration 
lab type is determined by the accuracy level of calibration standards maintained 
and employed in the calibration or repair of equipment For example, if a Type 
N lab had a standard for the inch, the Type III standard would be accurate to 
0.10 inch, the Type II standard would be accurate to 0.01 inch, and the master 
inch at the Primary Standards Lab (Type I) would have an accuracy of 0.001 
inch. 
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2. Calibration Workload Scheduling 
The primary objective of the METCAL Program is to accomplish the 
calibration and incidental repair of PME/TAMS used for 0- and !-level 
maintenance functions by the operating forces. Metrology and calibration is 
budgeted, funded, and managed as a subprogram under the D-level Aircraft 
Support Services Program. The Metrology Automated System for Uniform 
Recall and Reporting (MEASURE) provides management information and data 
required to execute the COMNA V AIRSYSCOM METCAL Program. 
The recall of equipment for calibration, at established intervals, is 
facilitated by the MEASURE. NAV AVNDEPOTOPSCEN publishes and 
monitors equipment recall schedules, and allocates resources required to execute 
the schedules. These schedules determine workload composition, authorizing 
MEASURE customers to forward specific equipment to the laboratories 
indicated for calibration. 
Equipment scheduled into a laboratory for calibration and servicing is 
based on calibration intervals established by Metrology Engineering, the 
Metrology Requirements list (NA 17-35MTL-l), and the number of active 
metrology standards in the inventory at the various Type N laboratories. A 
determination must also be made as to the number and the extent of on-site 
servicing required, as well as the hours required for lab servicing. The 
accomplishment of these requirements is subject to funding constraints and 
availability of laboratory man-hours to perform the work. The availability of 
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laboratory man-hours is determined during periodic fleet readiness support 
meetings. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter has described in general terms the organizational structure of 
the DoD and DON D-level Industrial Program. The main functional and 
operational players have been identified and their interaction within the depot 
maintenance environment are described. The METCAL Program was defined 
and the role of calibration laboratories in the depot maintenance scheme was 
conveyed. The chapter provides the basis for understanding specific material 
flows and production process that will be discussed in later chapters. 
It is important to keep in mind that the information in this chapter is 
limited in that it only establishes a framework for authorities, responsibilities, 
functions, and relationships of organizations in the D-Level Industrial Program. 
Specifically, the three depots have evolved, in some respects, independently. 
Because of differences in equipment supported by each depot, each organization 
differs in their operations, processes, and structure at lower echelons. Specific 
attention to the organization and functional programs at NADEP, North Island 
will be described and analyzed in later chapters. 
The following chapter describes the evolution of the Regional 
Maintenance Concept (RMC), and where the DoD /DON is today with respect to 
implementation of Regional Repair Centers. 
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V. 1HE REGIONAL MAINTENANCE CONCEPT 
The information contained in this chapter is provided as background and 
current status of the Regional Maintenance Concept It does not reflect the 
opinions or views of the authors and is derived from published briefs and 
documents as referenced. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Historically, naval maintenance policy was formulated within warfare 
areas (e.g., aviation, submarine, and surface) and platform lines (e.g., P-3 Orions, 
A-6 Intruders, frigates, destroyers, etc.). As each new weapons system was 
fielded, either existing maintenance support infrastructure within the warfare 
area would be modified to meet the needs of the new system or new 
maintenance support would be introduced. Navy maintenance managers in the 
past have given little regard to existing maintenance capability and capacity in 
other warfare areas, nor whether they could act in support of common 
maintenance functions. Recognition of this shortcoming in the way the Navy 
does business led to a new vision for the future of Navy maintenance. This 
vision of the future naval maintenance policy and programs includes the 
development of a ~~ ... seamless functional support structure that optimizes the existing 
maintenance process commonality among all platforms." [Ref. 3] 
This vision is built upon the Battle Force Intermediate Maintenance 
Activity (BFIMA) concept, which has been used by aviation and surface repair 
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within the battle group afloat. The BFIMA concept takes advantage of the 
significant maintenance capability and capacity resident within the aircraft 
carrier Engineering and Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Departments, to 
provide enhanced support to accompanying ships and their embarked aircraft 
In an effort to simultaneously optimize maintenance support at lower cost and 
enhanced self-sufficiency, the Navy is attempting to duplicate the successful 
example of common maintenance process execution afloat with a mirrored 
process ashore. It was the success of the BFIMA that gave birth to the Regional 
Maintenance Concept (RMq ashore. [Ref. 3] 
B. IDSTORY 
President Ointon initiated a six month review of the federal government 
in the 1993 National Performance Review and tasked Vice President Gore with 
leading the effort. In remarks announcing the National Performance Review, 
President Ointon stated: 
Our goal is to make the entire federal government both less expensive and 
more efficient, and to change the culture of our national bureaucracy away 
from complacency and entitlements toward initiative and empowerment. 
We intend to redesign, to reinvent, and to reinvigorate the entire national 
government. 
This ambitious initiative, ''to do more with less" by the President has rippled 
through the entire federal government, especially the Department of Defense 
(DoD) and the Department of the Navy (DON). [Ref. 4] 
In response to the Defense Management Report Decision (DMRD) 908 of 
1989, and more recently the National Performance Review, the Navy has 
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commenced a major initiative to save money and become more efficient by 
streamlining its industrial infrastructure. Admiral Mike Boorda, then Chief of 
Naval Operations, stated the Navy's goal: [Ref. 5] 
... to size regions' ashore industrial infrastructure to eliminate excess 
capacity. We [Navy flag officers] must continue from where the Base 
Realignment and Closure Commission (BRA C) decision has taken us. We 
must aggressively reduce the footprint and cost of our industrial 
capability, ... , The integrated nature of our Naval Forces- ships, 
submarines, aviation, and the systems that support them- present us 
with a unique opportunity to demonstrate significant savings through 
this approach (Regional Maintenance). 
The CNO established an Executive Steering Committee (ESC) composed 
of his most senior deputies to address the issues of downsizing and mission 
readiness. The ESC's approach to this challenge included commissioning 
Quality Management Boards (QMB) charged with developing means of coping 
with budget reductions in specific areas of Navy operations and maintenance. 
[Ref. 3] 
Seven QMBs were instituted in 1993 to focus on assigned areas impacting 
Navy readiness and affordability. The focus areas are: Budget, Environment, 
Fleet Support (FS), Information Systems, Jointness, Roles and Missions, and 
Quality of Life. The FS QMB, in turn, identified ten separate target areas for 
concentration, and chartered a subordinate QMB for each target area. The ten 
target areas are: information, management, maintenance, material, people, shore 
establishment, safety and environment, training, transportation, and weapon 
systems. As several of the FS QMB areas of interest crossed into other QMBs, 
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there was a concerted effort to develop an evaluation and management· process 
capable of fully exchanging information and ideas that might be explored in the 
Maintenance Support QMB (MS QMB) and be of interest to one another. As a 
result of this process, the Regional Maintenance ''Chain of Command" was 
established, as shown in Figure 5.1. [Ref. 3) 
1. Maintenance Support QMB 
The Maintenance Support QMB (MS QMB) was specifically chartered 
... to improve the quality of fleet maintenance support and to define and 
develop a transition strategy for moving toward the minimum, most 
e.ffident, fleet maintenance support infrastructure which will satisfy the 
Navy's needs into the Twenty-first Century. [Ref. 3] 
The MS QMB is chaired by the Director of Maintenance under the Deputy Grief 
of Naval Operations for Logistics and is composed of members from the CNO 
staff, all Systems Commands and Fleet Commanders. The MS QMB is unique in 
that it united senior maintenance managers from aviation, submarine, and 
surface ship communities ·in an effort to jointly address issues that impact all 
parts of the Navy. 
As the budget was reducing annually to reach a steady state at the end of 
this century when DoD manpower and force structure are expected to stabilize, 
the Comptroller of the Navy identified a fiscal target for each QMB. The MS 
QMB target was to reduce the cost of maintenance contribution to the Operations 
and Maintenance, Navy (O&MN) account by approximately 1.2 billion dollars 
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2. Development Of The Regional Maintenance Concept 
Admiral Boorda stated the Navy goal, 
... is to have our ship and aviation maintenance and logistics .support 
processes become more similar by taking advantage of the best practices 
that we can identify. We must evolve to the same processes through smart 
planning when there is a clear benefit to the fleet in terms of lower costs 
and improved readiness. [Ref. 5] 
The RMC features a single maintenance management process, to 
standardize and enhance the battle forces intermediate maintenance capability 
afloat, and to adopt a regional maintenance support strategy for all naval 
maintenance ashore. The strategy envisions a single maintenance manager who 
would spearhead the right-sizing of all industrial facilities, and a single, 
accessible and responsible provider of maintenance support to the customer, 
with the primary focus on the material readiness of the deploying battle group. 
For example, under the regional maintenance strategy, faulty black boxes 
from aircraft, ships, and submarines could be sent to the same shore repair 
facility known as a Regional Repair Center (RRq. 
In developing their strategy for optimizing maintenance at reduced cost, 
the MS QMB identified six principal objectives: [Ref. 3] 
• Eliminate excess maintenance infrastructure capacity and capability 
• Improve maintenance processes 
• Provide compatible Automated Data Processes (ADP) to serve all 
maintenance providers 
• Better integrate supply support and maintenance requirements 
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• Provide management visibility of all maintenance related costs 
• Preserve the technical control of the Systems Commands, life cycle 
support, responsiveness to the fleet, and readiness. 
3. Implementation Of Regional Maintenance 
In February 1994, the CNO ESC approved a phased execution plan for 
Regional Maintenance. The CNO issued the implementation order for the 
Regional Maintenance Concept in March 1994 [Ref. 7]. Due to the complexity of 
the undertaking and the scope of change, the concept is to be divided and 
implemented in three phases: Phase One FY 95-96, Phase Two FY 96-97, Phase 
Three 97-98. 
During the preliminary phase, the primary task is for the maintenance 
managers to optimize intermediate level interoperability by minimizing 
redundant capability and capacity, by process improvement, and by resource 
sharing under the management of the Fleet Maintenance Officers (FMO). Fleet 
technical support for non-nuclear matters would be consolidated under the Fleet 
Technical Support Centers (FTSC), which would report directly to the FMO. 
Intermediate and Depot Levels of maintenance will be integrated during 
the second phase and managed by the FMO and regional maintenance 
managers. During the third and final phase, Fleet maintenance is to be 
conducted using a single maintenance process supported by common business 
and production practices and by a common data foundation in both fleets. This 
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single manager approach will provide a clear process for ensuring technical 
authority and oversight by the Systems Commanders. [Ref. 3) 
The transition to regional· maintenance commenced with the issuance of 
the CNO directive and was anchored by seven ·pillars: policy, planning, 
production, automated information systems (AIS), human resources, finance, 
and supply. 
C. SOUTHWEST REGION DEFINED 
The Regional Naval Maintenance Plan commenced October 1, 1995 under 
the direction and leadership of the FMOs. 
1. Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Regions 
The Atlantic and Pacific FMOs divided the Navy geographically into 
eight regions (Figure 5.2). The Atlantic Fleet developed regions in the Northeast 
(New London-Portsmouth), Mid-Atlantic (Norfolk), Southeast (Jacksonville-
Mayport-Kings Bay), and the Gulf Coast (Ingleside-Corpus Christi). In the 
Pacific Fleet, regions were created in the Southwest (San Diego), Pacific 
Northwest (Puget Sound), Hawaii (Pearl Harbor), and Western Pacific 
(Yokosuka, Japan). Within each region a regional maintenance infrastructure is 
being established to oversee implementation. [Ref. 6) 
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2. The Southwest Region 
The Southwest Region encompasses all shore based Navy maintenance 
activities from San Francisco Bay Area to San Diego and then eastward to Naval 
Air Station, Fallon, NV. Principal maintenance providers within the region 
include: 
• NADEP North Island, San Diego AIMD Naval Air Station North 
Island, CA 
• AIMD Naval Air Station Miramar, CA-(ordered realigned to a U.S. 
Marine Air Station by BRAC 951) 
• AIMD Naval Air Station Lemoore, CA 
• AIMD Naval Air Station Fallon, NV 
1 AIMD Miramar and North Island planned to consolidate calibration laboratories regardless of the BRAC 
realignment. Although this may be true, this demonstrates that RMC is not occurring in a vacuum thus, 
there are other dynamics at play in reduction of Navy infrastructure. 
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• Naval Air Weapons Station Point Mugu, CA 
• Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA 
• Long Beach Naval Shipyard-(ordered closed by BRAC 95) 
3. The Regional Coordinator 
At the onset of regional maintenance,· the Pacific Fleet Type Commanders 
were responsible for implementation planning and execution within the Pacific 
Fleet regions as delineated by the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet Due to the 
size of the surface fleet homeported in the San Diego area, the Commander, 
Naval Surface Force Pacific Fleet was assigned oversight of regional 
maintenance in the Southwest region. 
An executive level board ·known as the Regional Maintenance Working 
Group (RM WG) was chartered to act as a uboard of directors" for management 
of the revolutionary new concept. Their primary responsibility is to set and 
implement policies that will lead to eventual full implementation of the RMC. 
The board is comprised of senior maintenance managers representing systems 
commands and fleet maintenance management activities within the southwest 
region. Among the members of the RM WG are the Commander Naval Surface 
Force Fleet, Commander Naval Air Force Assistant Chiefs of Staff for ship and 
aircraft maintenance, Naval Aviation Depot Commanding Officer, Surface Force 
Pacific Enhanced Readiness Support Group (ERSG) Commanding Officer, 
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Supervisor of Shipbuilding Conversion and Repair, and the Commanding 
Officer Fleet Technical Support Center (FTsq Pacific. [Ref. 6] 
a. Enhanced Readiness Support Group 
The Surface Force Pacific Readiness Support Group (RSG) was 
designated as the maintenance coordinator and principal agent for the 
implementation of regional maintenance in the Southwest Region. In this 
capacity they are responsible for ·near-term implementation actions and 
centralized maintenance job planning, brokering (assignment), and progressing. 
Consistent with the broadening of RSG roles and missions to include regional 
maintenance coordination, three specific enhancements to the RSG were made; 
thus they became the Enhanced Readiness Support Group (ERSG). Upon 
designation of the ERSG as the regional maintenance coordinating activity, the 
Commanding Officer of ERSG assumed· chairmanship of the RM WG, relieving 
the Naval Surface Force Pacific Maintenance Officer. Figure 5.3 depicts ERSG 
within the uRegional Coordinator Concept''. [Ref. 6] 
To ensure accountability for all platforms, the Commanding Officer of 
ERSG reports to the Commander, Naval Surface Force Pacific 
(COMNA VSURFP Aq, Commander, Naval Air Force Pacific 
(COMNAV AIRP Aq, and Commander, Submarine Pacific (COMSUBPAq. 
Within the ERSG, a Regional Maintenance Development Group (RM DG) was 
chartered to support implementation of RMC. Personnel from the Type 
Commander staffs were provided to supplement the ERSG. These personnel 
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staff the RM DG and platform management positions within the ERSG. For 
example, the CV I CVN Maintenance Manager performs brokering for CV I CVN 
work through the ERSG to regional repair activities. The manager also serves as 
platform advocate for the CV ICVNs assigned in San Diego, ensuring a smooth 
transition from historic platform stovepipe support to sharing common regional 
maintenance resources. It is important to clarify that the ERSG does not have 
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brokering, tracking, and coordination functions between all of the maintenance 
repair facilities. The maintenance activities continue to report to their existing 
chains of commands for the foreseeable future. The ERSG organization structure 
is shown in Figure 5.4. [Ref. 6] 
D. REGIONAL MAINTENANCE CHALLENGES 
Four very important issues come to the forefront when analyzing RMC 
and integration of intermediate and depot level maintenance into a single level 
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1. Financial Management Policy 
Currently some maintenance facilities operate under Defense Business 
Operating Funds (DBOF) while others receive funding from mission or 
Appropriated Funds. For example, NADEP North Island is a DBOF activity and 
AIMD North Island is funded through appropriations. A financial management 
policy is needed to standardize and simplify maintenance funding. 
2. Organic Versus Commercial Capability 
How will the Navy maintain its ships in the face of large reductions in 
organic capacity and capability? The Navy has adopted a well publicized policy 
resulting from a Department of Defense Roles and Missions study to limit 
organic repair capability to only a defined u core" of essential work and to 
contract more to the private sector [Ref. 8]. The number and types of aircraft 
homeported within each region, and the presence or lack of a robust commercial 
overhaul and repair base, significantly impact the manner in which regional 
maintenance will be implemented and function. Regional maintenance must 
find a way to provide the required maintenance with fewer resources while 
achieving Operations and Maintenance, Navy (O&MN) cost reductions and 
making the transition invisible to the Fleet Readiness must not be traded-off for 
cost reductions. 
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3. Cultural Issues 
The third challenge deals with resolving key organizational issues of who 
owns, who supports, and who controls the fleet maintenance process. 
Parochialism between the warfare areas is embedded deep in Navy culture and 
goes back to its roots. The Navy consists of many long-standing and powerful 
platform advocates that create an environment where each 
community j organization may be looking out for what is best for the Navy from 
a platform bias. The underlying causes of this competitive behavior have to be 
understood and corrected to establish a truly "seamless" maintenance support 
structure. 
4. Manpower Capacity 
Manpower capacity ashore plays a major role in maintenance support and 
overall mission readiness. The number of active duty personnel required at 
repair activities reflect three principal requirements. The first is the provision of 
sea-shore rotational assignments so that sea duty personnel can be assured 
adequate shore duty. This is a very important Quality of Life issue and impacts 
recruitment, training, and retention. Second is the retention and enhancement of 
technical skills required to repair platforms and installed systems at sea. For 
many Navy technical rates, there are limited ashore billets that allow for use of 
these skills. Maintaining perishable technical skills that are expensive to acquire 
requires continuous work within the respective trade specialties. Third, 
maintenance performed by sailors assigned ashore makes a large contribution to 
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fleet material readiness. Consolidation of maintenance capacity and capabilities 
inevitably involves reduction of shore billets which are critical to overall 
mission. Care must be exercised in identifying excess manpower capacity so as 
not to eliminate too many key shore billets. 
E. REGIONAL REP AIR CENTERS 
The first step in the process of optimizing regional capability and capacity 
is to identify redundant capabilities among all regional maintenance activities. 
Experience has shown that the more places a certain type of item is repaired, the 
more likely there is excess capacity. As each facility is manned to accommodate 
historical workload peaks, it is almost certain that consolidation to fewer 
locations will reveal excess capacity and be available for work that otherwise 
might not be done within Navy organic repair facilities. Under the RMC, these 
consolidated shops of redundant capabilities within a region are known as 
Regional Repair Centers (RRCs). [Ref. 6] 
1. Regional Repair Center Candidates 
Between FY 1995 and 1999 RRC candidates will be identified by the RM 
WG and then subjected to a rigorous evaluation process. [Ref. 3] 
Recommendations for RRCs comes in three forms: consolidation of all shops 
into a centrally located facility; co-location, wherein two or more shops will 
share common support resources such as planning, tech library, etc.; and 
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consolidated support with multiple repair locations served by a single 
management facility. [Ref. 6] 
The RRC evaluation process is performed in ·four phases. Candidate 
capabilities and potential cost reducing options are evaluated and developed in 
the first two phases. In the third phase, a pilot RRC is developed, then 
submitted to a rigorous six-month evaluation in phase four. If the pilot RRC 
proves beneficial, the it becomes permanent. To date, over two dozen repair 
areas have been submitted to the RRC Development Process, one of which is 
Calibration Laboratories. [Ref. 6] 
2. Calibration Laboratories 
At the inception of the Regional Maintenance effort there were over thirty 
calibration laboratories in the Southwest Region. Reductions in ships and 
aircraft requiring support resulted in all calibration laboratories having excess 
capacity. The largest data gathering analysis effort to date in the Southwest 
Region was launched February 1994 to determine the optimum calibration 
laboratory posture for the region. [Ref. 6) 
The Southwest Mechanical Calibration Process Action Team (PAT) 
identified potential savings in the areas of personnel reductions and acquisition 
and maintenance of calibration standards. The analysis identified over two 
hundred personnel in excess of workload requirements employed in the 
calibration facilities. Additionally, significant duplication of standards was 
45 
found throughout the region, each requiring on average about ·two thousand 
dollars annually in maintenance costs. [Ref. 6] 
A Calibration RRC Evaluation Process Action Team, chartered to perform 
an in-depth study on the calibration laboratories in the Southwest region, 
recommended consolidation from thirty three laboratories to six. Two major 
multi-functional and multi-customer laboratories would exists in the San Diego 
area: one for ships at the Ship Intermediate Maintenance Activity (SIMA) and 
one for aviation at the NADEP. The Primary Standards Laboratory (Type I) 
would absorb the functions of the Metrology Engineering Center at Corona into 
a single laboratory at NADEP, North Island, CA. Finally, all the laboratories in 
each of the Point Mugu, China Lake, and Lemoore areas would consolidate into 
one facility at each location. 
F. SUMMARY 
Today, the financial reality is much different than during the Reagan 
military buildup of the 1980s when maintenance money was plenteous. In a 
political environment of shrinking defense dollars, the Navy needs to maintain a 
high level of readiness with fewer maintenance funds. Development of the 
Regional Maintenance Concept that focuses ·on consolidation, elimination of 
excess capacity, and the avoidance of redundant capabilities, is the strategy the 
Navy has selected to fulfill its fleet support requirements in the Twenty-first 
Century. The importance of Regional Maintenance is such that the program to 
develop it has been designated a National Performance Review Reinvention 
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Laboratory to continue, ii ••• plans to build a coordinated and user friendly 
maintenance system at low cost to the operating forces [Ref. 9]." 
Calibration Laboratories is an area where, potentially, millions of dollars 
may be saved annually. Streamlining of the calibration maintenance 
infrastructure is underway in the Southwest Region, but is experiencing 
problems with financial policy, cultural and manpower issues. The next two 
chapters will focus in-depth on the current challenge in consolidation of the 
calibration laboratories at NADEP North Island. 
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VI. EXPECTED BENEFITSOF CONSOLIDATED CAI.ffiRATION 
LABORATORIES AS REGIONAL REPAIR CENTERS 
The previous chapter explained that the more places a component is 
repaired, the more likely that excess repair capacity exists. Similarly , excess 
capacity may become apparent when redundant capabilities and capacity are 
consolidated and/ or collocated. By identifying excess capacity and redundant 
capabilities, an organization can reduce costs and improve processes and 
operations, thus becoming more efficient, economical and effective. Efficiency is 
the relationship between actual and planned resources. It tells how well the 
resources were used. Economical is the ability to perform the assigned mission 
within allotted resources. And, effectiveness is defined by results, i.e., how well 
goals are achieved. 
In February 1994, the Southwest Regional Maintenance Working Group 
(SWRM WG) directed the formation of the Southwest Region Electronic and 
Mechanical Calibration Consolidation Process Action Team (PAT). Primary 
goals were to examine calibration and repair infrastructure and potential for 
consolidation. Thirty-three site visits, data reductions, and data analyses were 
completed by the Southwest Region Electronic and Mechanical Calibration 
Consolidation PAT on 1 March 1995. Capabilities, capacities, operating 
expenses, man-hour rates, and workloads were determined for each facility. 
Nine consolidation options emerged as potential candidates. [Ref. 10] One of 
the options consisted of consolidating AIMDs at Miramar and North Island and 
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collocating the new, larger calibration lab with NADEP North Island. This was 
implemented November, 1995. This chapter and the remainder of this thesis 
will present findings from on-site visits to AIMDs Miramar and North Island, 
NADEP North Island, AIRP AC and the RMC Headquarters in the Southwest 
Region. Benefits of the consolidated 1-Levellaboratories and collocated 1- and 
D-Level laboratories as well as any weaknesses or problems they are 
experiencing, will be described. Finally, the potential benefits of full 
consolidation will be analyzed and the barriers to implementation identified. 
A. CONSOLIDATION OF AIMDs MIRAMAR AND NORTII ISLAND 
CALffiRATION LABORATORIES 
1. Benefits 
a. Manpower Benefits 
It must be emphasized that accurate assessment of manpower 
utilization is crucial to realizing manpower savings. Regardless of the degree of 
consolidation, a manpower utilization analysis is needed to meet the manpower 
savings objective of consolidation. Manning requirements for the consolidated 
activity must be evaluated and excess personnel cut from manpower 
authorizations. There will be no manpower cost savings if the consolidated 
repair activity simply integrates all the personnel from the source AIMD into its 
operations. If one AIMD operation is run with two shifts and two supervisors, 
and the other AIMD operation is run with three shifts and three supervisors, 
there are five supervisors between the two AIMDs. If this repair function were 
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consolidated, it is not unreasonable to expect the consolidated operation to be 
run with no more than three shifts and three supervisors. Prior to the 
consolidation of AIMDs Miramar and North Island, :Miramar had eleven 
military and eleven civilian calibration laboratory technicians, whereas North 
Island had 23 military and two civilian calibration laboratory technicians. After 
the consolidation of the two 1-level calibration laboratories, nine military and 
eleven civilian billets were eliminated from Miramar, of which North Island 
gained one billet to increase to 24 technicians. This reduction of civilian 
personnel billets represents a potential annual savings of approximately $400,000 
to $418,000. 
b. Training Benefits 
Training benefits could be substantial when the repair of entire 
functions or families of parts is consolidated. Calibration technicians at a 
consolidated maintenance site would be exposed to components from all the 
different aircraft types serviced by the consolidated site, rather than just the 
components peculiar to the aircraft serviced by an individual AIMD. Cross-
training increases technician capabilities, which is especially beneficial for 
aircraft carrier (CV) operations. CV AIMDs are tasked with supporting many 
different types of aircraft from several functional wings. The broader the base of 
technician experience, the easier it is for the CV AIMD to service the embarked 
airwing. The greater degree of consolidation should provide for more mutual 
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support amongst technicians and allow a more active approach to training 
needs. 
c. Standards Reduction 
Laboratories are directed to maintain the minimum number of 
standards required to ensure adequate coverage for their customers. Standards 
inventories represent large costs savings or avoidance potential. Consolidation 
actions must address which standards will be :retained and which ones will be 
placed in inactive or disposal status. NA V AIR controls standards through Naval 
Aviation Depot Operations Center (NADOC) for higher echelon laboratories and 
the TYCOM controls Field Calibration Activities (FCA) standards. Two areas of 
cost savings are anticipated from workload consolidation. Projected man-hour 
reductions will equate to less required billets for the same customer workload. 
A second savings is the reduction in overflow costs associated with sending 
some standards to a higher echelon laboratory for calibration. These costs can be 
significant due to the higher hourly rate usually charged by these laboratories. 
[Ref. 11] Before consolidation of the two 1-level calibration laboratories, the total 
number of standards maintained was approximately 1940. Since the 
consolidation the total number of standards has been reduced to approximately 
1044. \Vith $2,000 established as the annual maintenance costs for each standard, 
this equates to a potential savings of approximately $1,592,000. 
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d. Inventory Reduction 
Consolidating spare parts inventories also is affected by 
consolidation. The spare parts inventory is comprised of three elements: 1) 
material in the pipeline (in transit between stocking or production points 
because material transportation is not instantaneous); 2) regular or iicyclical" 
stock necessary to meet average demand between replenishments; and 3) safety 
stock, which is inventory over and above regular stock and kept as a hedge 
against variability in demand and replenishment lead time. [Ref. 12] Meeting 
aircraft component repair demand requires a high level of spare parts safety 
stock because the quantity and timing of demand (variability) is difficult to 
predict Consolidating inventory can reduce the quantity of parts required for 
safety stock because as demand is concentrated at fewer stocking points, there is 
less uncertainty in demand to take into consideration and total safety stocks can 
be reduced. [Ref. 12] The following theoretical example illustrates the potential 
for inventory savings through consolidation: [Ref. 2] 
North Island AIMD's average lead time demand for consumable 
Part XYZ is four per week, and demand varies with a standard 
deviation of two. Assuming normally distributed demand, 90% 
protection against stock-out (i.e., a 10% probability of stock-out) is 
1.28 standard deviations above the mean. Accordingly, to have 
90% confidence that a Part XYZ will be available when needed, 
North Island will have to maintain safety stock of 1.28 x 2 = 2.56 
parts. Miramar AIMD' s average weekly demand for Part XYZ is 
eight with a standard deviation of three. To maintain the same 
90% confidence factor, Miramar's safety stock will have to be 1.28 x 
3 = 3.84. This means the Part XYZ safety stock held between the 
two AIMDs is 2.56 + 3.84 = 6.40 parts. 
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If repair capabilities were consolidated, the average consolidated 
demand for Part XYZ would be expected to be the sum of the 
demand of the individual AIMDs, which is 12 per week. The 
standard deviation of the consolidated demand would be the 
square root of the sum of the variances of the individual AIMDs, 
which is 3.6. Thus, to maintain a 90% confidence level of being 
able to fill requirements immediately upon demand, the 
consolidated activity would only have to maintain safety stock of 
1.28 x 3.6 = 4.60 Part XYZs, which is a savings of 6.40 - 4.60 = 1.80 
parts. 
e. Streamlining Facilities 
Facilities are required to support activities pertaining to the 
accomplishment of active maintenance tasks, providing warehousing functions 
for spares and repair parts, conducting training, and providing housing for 
related administrative functions. [Ref. 2) Savings can be realized by avoiding 
costs associated with the operation of facilities that are closed by consolidation. 
Planned building demolition and industrial consolidation reduces operation and 
maintenance costs, increases industrial efficiency in a more compact, tailored 
facility and reduces personnel overhead that seems to accompany large, under-
utilized buildings. [Ref. 13) The consolidation of the two AIMDs and their 
collocation to NADEP North Island should have produced overhead savings in 
the elimination of the calibration laboratory facilities. But, with BRAC 95 NAS 
Miramar will become Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, meaning the Marines 
will be taking over the facilities, and the facility at AIMD North Island is being 
used as an office space. Unless the buildings are demolished, leased or sold 
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after they are vacated due to consolidation there will be no cost savings or cost 
avoidance. 
f. Improved AIMD Productivity 
Queuing theory supports the conclusion that consolidating 
duplicate AIMD capabilities can improve productivity. Queuing theory is the 
study of the arrival of customers to some type of process, the time customers 
spend waiting to be served, and the time they spend being served. Queues form 
as customers arrive and await service. Waiting lines for bank tellers, traffic toll 
booths and grocery check-outs are familiar queues. Queuing theory has 
developed a number of models that can be used to predict the average number 
of customers awaiting service, the average number of customers in the system, 
the average time spent awaiting service and the average total time in the system. 
These models are based on the three basic characteristics of queuing systems: 1) 
arrivals (customers or demand); 2) service mechanism (people and/ or 
equipment); and 3) queue discipline (first-in/first-out, last-in/last-out, etc.). 
[Ref. 14] 
The rate customers arrive for service (the number of customers that 
arrive during an interval of time) is one of the basic characteristics of a queuing 
system. For AIMDs, this characteristic is present in non-Ready For Issue (RFI) 
aircraft parts and equipment requiring I-level maintenance or repair. The non-
RFI items (customers) begin queuing up when they arrive at AIMD Production 
Control for induction into the repair cycle. The components must wait 
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(Awaiting Maintenance (AWM)) in the repair cycle queue until a service channel 
(maintenance technician with required testj repair equipment), is available. The 
arrival rate of non-RFI items is based on the failure rate of the component and 
(for the vast majority of items) is independent of the failure rate of other items. 
There is a finite population of potential AIMD H customers" (!-level 
repairable parts and equipment) at any one time. This population of customers 
is dependent on the number of supported activities and the number of 
components installed in supported weapons systems. The arrival rate of 
components r' customers") for AIMD repair is dependent on the failure rate, or 
reliability function, of the specific equipment Non-RFI items could arrive in a 
fairly consistent pattern (as with parts on scheduled maintenance intervals) or 
the arrival pattern could be quite irregular (unscheduled maintenance actions). 
The difference in the arrival rates of non-RFI components into the AIMD repair 
cycle is based on differences in the distribution of failures. Failure rate 
distribution patterns include gamma, Weibull, and many others. [Ref. 2] 
Another basic queuing theory characteristic is queue discipline, 
which concerns the order in which customers are taken from the queue. Queues 
can have a variety of disciplines. Common methods include; first-in/ first-out, 
last-in/ first-out, shortest processing time or longest processing time. 
Additionally, there can be differences in the manner of customer service within 
these basic methods. Some queue disciplines allow for Hjumping," which is 
com..--non at retail store check-outs where customers "jockey'' for position in the 
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line with the fastest service. Other queues establish some type of priority 
system, like a hospital emergency room where the seriously injured patients are 
served first [Ref. 15] As described in Chapter III, AIMDs have an established 
priority system for servicing customers. The first customers to be served are the 
Expeditious Repair, or uEXREP'' components. Priority 2 (PRI 2) customers 
r' pool critical") are next in line, and Priority 3 customers are served last 
The variety of ways in which the three basic queuing 
characteristics can be combined is infinite. Consequently, much research has 
been devoted to the understanding and expansion of queuing theory, with 
emphasis on developing mathematical techniques to assist in the analysis of 
queuing models. A principal area of study in mathematical queuing analysis is 
the effects of combining two or more separate queues. This area of study has 
direct application to the analysis of consolidating AIMD workloads and repair 
capabilities. The process of combining queues is termed "pooling." 
Pooling has been shown to increase the efficiency of a queuing 
system by lowering the total time a customer spends in the system, and 
decreasing the waiting time for service and the total number of customers in the 
system at any one time. These system improvements are independent of the 
arrival process and the distribution of service. In circumstances where the 
number of channels is very large, both good service and high utilization of assets 
is achieved. [Ref. 16] 
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hnprovement through decreasing the time customers spend 
waiting is obtained by using idle resources. Separate systems are less efficient 
because a customer can be waiting for service in one system while the other 
system is idle. [Ref. 17] fu separate systems, the next arriving customer may be 
blocked and have to wait until the customer being served departs the system. fu 
a combined system, the probability of a customer having to wait for service is 
lower because the probability that an idle service channel is available is higher. 
Consequently, even when a customer must wait for service, the average waiting 
times should be much less when separate facilities that service separate streams 
of customers are combined to serve all the streams together. [Ref. 18] Figure 
6.1 depicts the repair cycle that components (u customers") flow through at the 
consolidated AIMD Calibration Laboratory. 
2. Weaknesses or Problems 
a. Transportation 
Transportation is an essential element of consolidation because it is 
necessary for transferring Test And Monitoring Systems (TAMS) instruments 
tojfrom different laboratories. Activities shipping or receiving TAMS or in 
receiving on-site calibration services from the consolidated site add 
transportation time and costs to calibration processes. Time added and 
additional costs incurred depend on the destination, transportation method 
selected and frequency of deliveries. [Ref. 10] Therefore, the additional 
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transportation costs incurred due to consolidation will offset savings and must 
be considered in consolidation decisions. Transportation costs from the 
consolidation of Miramar and North Island calibration laboratories are minimal. 
A satellite receipt/ issue is maintained at Miramar for receiving and issuing 
equipment for sub-custodians located at Miramar. Miramar sub-custodians may 
deliver/pick-up equipment at the designated site or at NADEP North Island. 
Miramar is also providing a permanently assigned vehicle for transporting 
equipment to North Island, from the satellite receiptjissue. AIMD North Island 
sub-custodians now drop-off/pick-up equipment directly from the consolidated 
AIMD Calibration Laboratory at NADEP North Island. North Island is also 
providing a permanently assigned vehicle for on-site calibrations at North Island 
and Miramar. 
b. Facilities Modification Costs 
Facilities modification costs are directly related to the degree and 
type of consolidation and must be considered in the consolidation decision. 
Consolidation may require the modification of present facilities to accommodate 
the changes in workload. For example, if consolidation requires installation of 
additional test equipment and the present workspace is too small to allow 
expansion, an addition to the building or modification of its interior might be 
required. Another potential problem is that increases or changes in power 
requirements might call for the modification or utility services. Facility 
modification to AIMD North Island was unnecessary due to the fact that the 
60 
consolidated !-level calibration laboratories were collocated to NADEP No~ 
Island. 
c. Military Resiliency 
Military resiliency is the ability to recover from change or 
misfortune. Military resiliency is often thought of in terms of combat operations, 
i.e., the ability of an infantry company to reconstitute after sustaining combat 
losses. Consolidation will leave geographical areas more susceptible to a larger 
loss of its consolidated repair capability. For example, with both North Island 
AIMD and Miramar AIMD having calibration laboratories, there is an alternate 
site to continue work if one site should have to shut down as a result of fire or 
earthquake. However, if the calibration laboratories were consolidated at one or 
the other of these sites and there was a disaster such as fire or earthquake that 
destroyed the consolidated, site problems would arise. 
d. Customer Service Impact 
The objective of consolidation is cost reduction without 
degradation of customer service or operational readiness. It is essential to 
consider the impact consolidation will have on customer service before decisions 
are made regarding which capabilities to consolidate. The consolidation of 
AIMDs Miramar and North Island calibration laboratories has been transparent 
to their customers. Their customers are feeling no ill-affects from the 
consolidation [Ref. 19]. 
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B. COLLOCATION OF CONSOLIDATED I-LEVEL CALIBRATION 
LABORATORY WITH NADEP NOR1H ISLAND 
1. Benefits 
a. Training 
Calibration and repair of Navy TAMS require unique skills beyond 
that of a general mechanical or electronic technician. Almost all measurements 
require a very high level of precision and attention to detail. With the military-
manned laboratory being collocated with a higher echelon civilian laboratory, 
this provides Navy personnel with training advantages that otherwise would 
not be available. This is an opportunity for Navy personnel to receive a higher 
level of training through on-the-job-training (OJT) and formal/ in-classroom 
sessions on calibration and repair on Navy TAMS. This new level of knowledge 
could benefit the Navy as well as its personnel in that the experience gained can 
be used when the personnel transfer to sea duty or to another shore based 
activity. Military technicians could be working on a piece of equipment and 
come across a discrepancy that would normally stop maintenance production. 
Because of their extensive knowledge and experience, the artisans would 
provide OJT and/ or possibly some formal/ in-classroom training on what to 
look for and how to look for it as well as how to correct the discrepancy. 
Therefore, if the Navy technicians are presented with this discrepancy again they 
can correct it with the knowledge gained from the artisans, saving time and 
money. The military technicians collocated at NADEP North Island are 
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receiving some OJT from the artisans but, no formal/ in-classroom training is 
present The artisans will not provide formal/ in-classroom training unless it is 
specifically stated in their Position Descriptions (PDs). Interaction with career 
civilian technicians could provide relevant training to Navy personnel and could 
result in higher performance levels throughout Navy personnel careers. 
b. Flexibility of Collocated versus Consolidated 
Collocation provides more flexibility than consolidation. The 1-
level calibration laboratories at NADEP North Island are collocated, i.e., 
combined (centralized) but separate. Resources, manpower, chains of command 
and funding systems continue to be separate, which makes the activities easy to 
disconnect if the need arises. 
2. Weaknesses or Problems 
a. Facilities Modification Costs 
As discussed in Section A.2.b of this chapter, consolidation as well 
as collocation may require modifications of the present facility to accommodate 
the changes of integrating another unit into the process. The collocation of the 1-
level calibration laboratory with NADEP North Island required no modifications 
to the NADEP facility. Figure 6.2 illustrates the NADEP Calibration Laboratory 
facility footprint The vacant areas on the footprint are those which the 1-level 
Calibration Laboratory now occupies. NADEP is paying all costs associated 
with the operations of the facility at this time due to the inability to define 
exactly how to share all the costs. For example, electricity is not metered; 
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therefore NADEP cannot determine the exact amount used by the different units 
operating in the facility and thus cannot separate usage costs by units. They are 
considering a prorated costing model based on square footage utilized by each 
unit to solve such problems [Ref. 20]. 
C. CONSOLIDATION OF THE I- LEVEL CALIBRATION LABORATORY 
WITH THE NADEP NORTH ISLAND D-LEVEL CALIBRATION 
LABORATORY 
1. Benefits 
a. Training Benefits 
As stated earlier in the chapter, consolidated facilities can provide 
unique and beneficial opportunities for Navy personnel. Future cost avoidance 
or savings can be realized if Navy personnel were to interact with career civilian 
technicians of higher echelon laboratories. 
b. Standards Reduction 
As · addressed in Section A.1.c. of this chapter, standards 
inventories represent large costs savings or avoidance potentials. The first 
savings is the projected man-hour reductions that will require fewer billets for 
the same customer workload. A second savings is the reduction in overflow 
costs associated with sending some standards to a higher echelon laboratory for 
calibration. [Ref. 11] 
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2 Weaknesses or Problems 
a. Sea/Shore Rotation 
Sea maintenance ratings must be supported by meaningful shore 
duty to sustain a robust battle force repair capability. Shore maintenance billets 
are needed to provide continuing skill training (in some cases qualification 
training) and current experience for those personnel that will return to sea in a 
maintenance capacity. Also, shore maintenance billets can be used to support 
the necessary sea/ shore rotation for required sea billets and the home basing 
initiative. Military billets within regional maintenance activities should not 
exceed the sea/ shore rotation needs of the afloat Navy. Where workload 
exceeds the capacity of military maintenance personnel rotated ashore (with 
training requirements considered), civilian personnel could be assigned or the 
maintenance contracted out. (Ref. 21] 
b. Automated Infonnation Systems (AIS) 
Regional Maintenance relies on the efficient sharing of data 
generated by requesting activities and service providers. The establishment of 
an AIS and communications infrastructure that enables exchange of technical 
and management data is critical. The current maintenance information 
infrastructure is too fragmented to provide optimum support to accomplish the 
Navy's maintenance and repair mission. [Ref. 22] The programs most widely 
used and critical to carrying out Navy maintenance and repair missions are 
shown in Appendix B. 
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The existing maintenance management systems have historically, 
not needed to communicate outside their associated vertical community. Also, 
communication within the same "stovepipe" is sometimes discontinuous. For 
example, depot maintenance data is not currently included in the Naval 
Aviation Maintenance and Material Management Data System (AV -3M). The 
primary objective of the AV-3M is to provide for managing maintenance and 
maintenance support in a manner which will ensure maximum equipment 
operational readiness. Moreover, a number of different maintenance 
philosophies and business processes have evolved numerous unique information 
systems that compound the problem of sharing data across community 
boundaries. Maintenance of numerous, special purpose information 
management systems is program driven and expensive. The real cost to the 
Navy of so many systems is hard to determine since costs are embedded in 
many different budget lines. Regional maintenance seeks to adopt a common 
business approach where possible, and eventually converge the numerous 
information systems to a set of systems that have the connectivity necessary to 
facilitate the complete exchange of maintenance business and technical data 
within and among the various regions and in support of life cycle cost reduction. 
[Ref. 21] 
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c. Internal Chain of Command 
Presently there are two chains of command,· one for 1-level and one 
for D-level. Appendix C illustrates the two chains of command ·for the 1-level 
and D-level. If consolidation of the two is an option, then one chain of command 
would be appropriate. The purpose of the consolidated chain of command 
would be to support the management and administrative functions of the 
calibrated/ repair mission. An example of a consolidated chain of command 
could be the use of the Southwest Regional Maintenance Center Headquarters in 
San Diego, CA. If the NADEP North Island calibration laboratory and the 1-level 
calibration laboratory were to consolidate, then the Southwest Regional 
Maintenance Center Headquarters would be its chain of command. Neither 
NADEP North Island nor AIMD North Island would have control of the 
consolidated calibration laboratory. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter, has summarized the benefits and problems associated with 
consolidating two 1-level calibration laboratories and then collocating them with 
aD-level calibration laboratory. The potential benefits of full consolidation were 
analyzed. 
Collocation of the 1-level Calibration Laboratory appears to be a step in 
the right direction but the full benefits of a consolidated Regional Repair Center 
have not been achieved. The two major problems remain to be resolved 1) the 
current stovepiped organizational structure and culture of the Navy and 2) the 
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existence of two funding systems, with mission and DBOF funding, continue to 
be problems. These issues will need to be resolved in the future for complete 
and successful regionalization to occur. The following chapter will discuss in 
detail these two issues. 
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Vll. IMPEDIMENTS TO PROGRESS 
As a result of the Regional Maintenance initiative, the intermediate level 
calibration laboratories at Miramar and North Island have been consolidated 
while simultaneously being collocated with the NADEP North Island calibration 
laboratory. Streamlining of the calibration function in the North Island area has 
taken place with minimum difficulty due to the flexibility and "can do" attitude 
of the technicians and maintenance managers involved. Collocation of the 
calibration laboratories, although a step in the right direction, has not achieved 
the full benefits of a consolidated Regional Repair Center as intended under the 
Regional Maintenance Concept based upon the data gathered through 
interviews with Navy personnel participating in this reorganization. 
In general, the personnel interviewed held the common view that they 
have done as much as they could, within the limits of their authority and 
regulations, toward consolidating the calibration laboratories at North Island. 
Before they could take the next step toward full consolidation, top management 
in the Navy needs to make decisions about two major issues that are inhibiting 
the implementation of Regional Maintenance. 
The two major issues that repeatedly surfaced in almost every interview 
were: (1) the "stovepipe" organizational structure and culture of the Navy do 
not "fit'' the RMC model; (2) although it is possible to operate and manage with 
both mission and DBOF funding, it is inefficient and cumbersome to do so. One 
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financial management policy and method would simplify the existing, overly 
complex process. 
This chapter examines current Navy maintenance organizational structure 
and financial management policy, and the aspects of each that make it difficult to 
fully implement the Regional Maintenance Concept 
A. NAVY ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES 
Regional maintenance requires ubest business practices", benchmarking, 
and executive level consensus decisions to reach u smart" consolidations and 
reductions. A variety of tough organizational issues exist such as sharing of 
resources, resource ownership and priority, need for extensive communication 
and coordination, job enlargement, job enrichment/ cross skill development, 
integrated skill training, command/ promotion opportunity and community 
considerations, integration and mix of military and civilian workers, technical 
control in a multi-platform shop, job responsibility and mission redefinition. 
Any one of these issues may be offered as an excuse not to change. All, 
however, are symptomatic of a narrow perspective that has traditionally been 
applied in a singular, platform-based maintenance approach to organization. 
Consequently, lessons have been learned the hard way with controls applied 
accordingly. For example, problems associated with usplit job responsibility'' 
have been resolved in favor of avoiding the split entirely rather than 
determining how to manage a job with more than one participating activity. 
72 
Regional maintenance requires managers to reconsider traditional approaches to 
maintenance in favor of a more cost efficient and, potentially, effective model. 
1. Current Maintenance Strategies 
a. Aviation 
As described in previous chapters, Naval aircraft are maintained in 
accordance with OPNAV Instruction 4790.2 (Series). Organizational level 
technicians perform on-aircraft work, including removal of and replacement of 
components, both consumable and repairable. Field and depot level repairables 
removed are forwarded through supply to the supporting AIMD, both ashore 
and afloat When a component is repaired, it is returned to the supply 
deparbnent as ready-for-issue stock. Field level repairables that cannot be 
repaired are discarded by the AIMD. Depot level repairables that are beyond 
the capability of the AIMD are forwarded to a depot, Navy or commercial, for 
final disposition. 
b. Aircraft Carriers 
Aircraft carriers are maintained under three different philosophies; 
the Engineered Operating Cycle (EOC) for conventionally powered carriers 
(CVs), the Incremental Maintenance and Modernization Program (IMMP) for a 
forward deployed CV, and the CVN 68 Oass Incremental Maintenance Plan 
(IMP). The CV EOC is based on a series of short availabilities coupled with 
complex overhauls. The notional overhaul interval is six years with an overhaul 
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duration of twelve months. Between overhauls, material readiness is maintained 
during a three to five month Selected Restricted Availability (SRA) following 
each deployment The CV IMMP provides for a continuous, incremental, 
selected and restricted availability for accomplishment of phased repairs and 
alteration installation. A minimum of thirty days is spent in upkeep each 
quarter with a maximum sixty day availability accomplished once per year. 
Docking for major rework is scheduled every five to eight years. The CVN IMP 
provides for phased repairs and alteration installations through a six month 
planned, incremental availability following each deployment. Every third 
availability is an eleven month docking availability. A notional thirty-two 
month complex overhaul for refueling is accomplished at the mid-life of each 
CVN class aircraft carrier. 
c. Surface Ships 
The surface ship maintenance plan rests on a condition based 
strategy with short depot availabilities between deployments and major 
modernization availabilities, if required, every ten years. Between these 
availabilities (formally scheduled and budgeted) are shorter availabilities of 
intermediate and some depot level activities to accomplish emergent 
requirements. The port engineer is the key maintenance manager in the process 
and is responsible for identification and prioritization of maintenance 
requirements utilizing ship input, technical agent input, Systems Command 
maintenance plan and Type Commander direction and resources. 
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d. Submarines 
Submarines are maintained through the requirements of the Oass 
Maintenance Plans (CMP). Submarine CMP includes all levels of required 
maintenance; organizational, intermediate and depot While CMP vary between 
TRIDENT class SSBNs and fast attack submarine classes, the basic philosophy of 
uncompromising adherence to operationally proven and technically based CMP 
is a major factor in submarine high mission readiness and submarine safety. The 
Attack Submarine CMP is a compendium of 0, I & D level maintenance 
requirements and periodicities. The Submarine Extended Operating Cycle 
(SEOC) program is the basis of the attack submarines CMP. The SEOC program 
includes the following elements: maintenance requirements and standards, class 
maintenance plans and schedules, integrated maintenance and modernization 
planning, material condition feedback, and technical support 
The 688-class submarine approved operating cycle (OPCYCLE) is 
one hundred and twenty months long. Each OPCYCLE contains three operating 
intervals (OPINTERV AL) that are periods of Fleet operations (including 0 & I 
level maintenance periods) followed by homeport dry-docking selected, 
restricted availabilities (DSRA). The OPCYCLE is restarted by accomplishment 
of a Major Depot Availability (MDA), such as a refueling or overhaul, conducted 
at a shipyard. 
The TRIDENT maintenance concept includes a CMP that supports 
incremental overhaul, dedicated refit facilities {TRFs), a rotatable equipment 
75 
poot and a continuous material condition assessment (MCA) program. The 
TRIDENT submarine design has fully integrated life cycle support to facilitate 
integrated maintenance and modernization. The CMP provides for incremental 
overhaul and modernization at the TRF supported by enhanced I-level capability 
and the TRIDENT Planned Equipment Replacement Program (TRIPER) with 
rotatable pool equipment 
2. Command and Control of Navy Maintenance 
Ship and aircraft maintenance is currently controlled at several levels and 
within separate chains of command depending primarily upon the location of 
maintenance accomplishment; i.e., on-platform, at an Intermediate Maintenance 
Activity (IMA) or in a depot Differences exist between aviation and ship 
maintenance control as well as among the various platform systems involved. 
For example, strategic, nuclear, Aegis and aviation safety of flight systems have 
an extremely close linkage to their associated technical authority regardless of 
the location or level of maintenance accomplishment The following provides a 
brief description of the principal controlling authority for maintenance 
depending upon who does the work and where the work is accomplished. 
a. Organizational maintenance 
Organizational maintenance is controlled by the ship or aircraft 
squadron commanding officer. Work is identified by the unit, by scheduled 
planned maintenance programs or by hardware Systems Command approval of 
minor configuration changes within the capability of unit military personnel. 
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The commanding officer determines whether the work can be accomplished 
immediately or whether it must be deferred. Work is accomplished in 
accordance with published technical specifications and platform documentation 
provided by the Systems Commands. Funding is provided by the Fleets through 
the Type Commanders in an O&MN operating target for supplies and equipage 
made available from the Type Commander. Labor is provided by qualified 
military personnel assigned to the individual unit under Fleet claimancy. 
Quality assurance is performed in accordance with the applicable QA manuals. 
The unit commanding officer is responsible for the proper identification, 
accomplishment and retesting of work on their assigned ship or aircraft 
b. Intennediate level maintenance 
Intermediate level maintenance is controlled by the IMA 
commanding officer or department head. Ship IMAs exist within the chain of 
command of the Type Commander. An immediate senior in command may 
exist between the IMA commanding officer and the Type Commander. Afloat 
aviation intermediate maintenance departments (AIMD) work for the ship 
commanding officer. However, ashore AIMDs work for the naval air station 
commanding officer who is outside of the Type Commander direct chain of 
command. Work is identified by the units being supported and validated by the 
associated squadron material/ port engineer organization. Work is 
accomplished in accordance with technical specifications and platform 
documentation provided by the hardware Systems Commands. Funding is 
77 
provided by Fleets through the Type Commanders in O&MN operating targets 
for material and, in some cases, civilian salaries supporting the repair of vessels 
and aircraft Some funding is provided by activities outside of the Type 
Commander chain of command for special manufacturing projects or for 
calibration managed by Systems Commands. Labor is provided by qualified 
military and civilian personnel assigned to the intermediate maintenance 
activities under Fleet claimancy; a significant civilian workforce exists at some 
IMAs. Quality assurance is performed in accordance with the applicable QA 
manuals. The IMA commanding officer or department head is responsible to the 
maintained unit commanding officer for the proper accomplishment of assigned 
work. 
c. Depot maintenance 
Depot work accomplishment is controlled by the depot 
commander or, for private sector work, an administrative contracting officer. 
The depots report to the hardware Systems Commands. Work is identified by 
the individual units, the Type Commander material staffs and the Systems 
Commander platform logistic manager. A platform-specific maintenance 
protocol or strategy is prepared and maintained by the Systems Command 
platform manager in coordination with the Type Commanders. Funding is 
provided from a variety of sources. Aviation depot funding is provided by the 
Naval Air Systems Command for repairs and overhauls (O&MN) and for 
modifications (APN). The aviation Inventory Control Point (ICP) also funds 
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depots using fleet provided funding for aviation depot level repairables (A V-
DLR) and stock funds for manufacturing. Shipyards are funded by the Fleet for 
repairs (O&MN) and some alterations, and by the Naval Sea Systems Command 
OPN for major e'K'') alterations. Labor is mostly civilian, and for public depots 
is costed at a rate developed under the Defense Business Operation Fund 
(DBOF). Rates are set to provide for recovery or appropriate rebate of 
accumulated operating results from year to year. Quality assurance is 
performed in accordance with applicable specifications promulgated by the 
Systems Commands. Specifications may be more rigorous than those applicable 
to the organizational or intermediate levels since depot repairs can involve a 
restoration of systems and components to a pre-established maintenance cycle 
condition. Quality assurance is in accordance with Systems Command quality 
standards and programs. In some cases, the Type Commander may specify that 
the Type Commander quality assurance standards be applied if depot work is 
done by a depot work force at the IMA location. The depot commander (or the 
supervising authority for private sector work) is responsible to the maintained 
unit commanding officer and the appropriate Systems Command for the proper 
accomplishment of assigned work. 
3. Structure and Restructuring 
Issues involving community boundaries tend to come up due to the 
inherent differences in the repair processes used by the ship, air, and submarine 
communities. The ship community in the Southwest depends heavily on the 
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private sector and is generally not equipped to easily handle the local workload. 
The aviation repair process is closely aligned with the supply system that 
provides repair services for many of the components removed from aircraft for 
repair. Aviation Integrated Logistics Support resources (trained technicians, 
technical publications and data, support equipment, spare and repair parts, etc.) 
are specifically tailored to the workload anticipated at each activity, and are pre-
positioned only at the designed activities in accordance with the Naval Aviation 
Maintenance Program (NAMP) and Integrated Logistics Support Plans. This is 
call workload ""pre-brokering". Aviation maintenance workload is 
overwhelmingly ""pre-brokered", ship maintenance workload is not This puts 
aviation maintenance at odds with one of the primary thrusts of RMC: emergent 
workload planning and real-time brokering decisions at a single waterfront 
location for each region [Ref. 23]. Any regional maintenance initiatives that may 
disrupt this well developed relationship, including the upre-brokering" of work 
generates concern within the aviation community. The submarine community 
closely controls the maintenance performed on the boats, either through 
ownership of the maintenance activities or by using organic (shipyard) 
resources. Again, any initiatives that may affect this close control generate 
concern. Regionalization of maintenance will proceed only when these 
communities can be assured of the level of support that they now enjoy. 
The chain of command for decisions and control on regional maintenance 
issues is often clouded with guidance and tasking coming from outside the 
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traditional chain of command. It is particularly difficult when tasking is given 
without a reference such as a message or letter, if the tasking involves action in 
which all commands are not ready or able to participate. Regional maintenance 
also involves organizations outside the fleet claimancy that may or may not be 
willing to be full participants in the new process. Without clear guidance from 
their chain of command, it is difficult to get cooperation and participation on 
regional maintenance initiatives. 
The involvement and full participation of non-Fleet activities, such as 
weapon centers or other SYSCOM activities, is now based on individuals being 
"good citizens" rather than due to any formal tasking or direction. Generally, 
cooperation is forthcoming when "flag poles" are not at risk. However, the 
barriers go up if organizational authority, autonomy, or survival is threatened. 
Finding a workable arrangement of roles and relationships is an ongoing 
struggle in all organizations. Miller and Friesen have characterized many 
corporations and public bureaucracies as "stagnant or machine bureaucracies". 
[Ref. 24] Stagnant bureaucracies are described as older organizations controlled 
by past traditions and turning out obsolete product lines. [Ref. 24] A 
predictable and placid environment has lulled the organization to sleep, and top 
management is heavily committed to old ways. Information systems are not 
sophisticated enough to detect the need for change. The organizational culture 
resists change. Lower-level managers feel ignored and alienated. [Ref. 24] 
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a. Overcentralization 
Management literature teaches that two basic rules govern 
organizational design. First, strategy should determine structure. Strategy is 
defined as a pattern of purposes, policies, programs, actions, decisions, or 
resource allocations that define organization mission, what it does, why it does it 
and how it relates to its external environment The- second basic rule is that the 
organization should be as decentralized as possible. Contemporary 
management philosophy supports the concept that the effectiveness of large, 
complex organizations improves when authority and responsibility are 
delegated down into the organization. Of course, authority should not be 
arbitrarily or capriciously delegated. Decentralization requires prior 
clarification of the purpose or function of each administrative unit and 
responsibility center, procedures for setting objectives and for monitoring and 
rewarding performance, and a control structure that links each responsibility 
center to the goals of the organization as a whole. [Ref. 25) 
According to Robert N. Anthony and David Young, a 
responsibility center is an administrative unit headed by a manager who is 
responsible for its actions. Responsibility centers have purposes or objectives, 
and they use inputs (resources) to produce outputs (goods and services). The 
outputs of a well-designed responsibility center is closely related to its 
objectives. [Ref. 25) 
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Centralization is not to be confused with unity of command-that 
is, policy direction from the top, using hierarchically established goals and 
central control procedures. Unity of command characterizes all well-managed 
organizations. Rather, centralization is characterized by the use of before-the-
fact controls, by rules and regulations that specify what must be done as well as 
how, when, where, and by whom. Decentralization is characterized by after-the-
fact controls, by rewards and performance targets that are high enough to elicit 
the best efforts from organization personnel. [Ref. 25] 
Multiple layers of formal authority remove decisions far from their 
source so that decision making becomes both slow and inaccurate. In what is 
termed #machine bureaucracy" decisions are made at the strategic apex of the 
organization. Machine bureaucracies have a large support staff and techno-
structure; there are many layers between the apex and the operating levels. 
Authority and responsibility should, but do not go together. The primary 
structural issue is around motivating workers and initiating creativity at the 
operating core. [Ref. 26] 
Each warfare area within the Navy organization can be viewed as a 
functional bureaucracy within the overall Navy machine bureaucracy. No one 
office (Systems Command) is responsible for overall maintenance, but each has 
numerous sponsors that compound the complexity of the maintenance 
management program. Sponsorship is uncoordinated and often represents 
different agendas. This complexity is shown in Figure 7.1 depicting the parallel 
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STOVEPIPE BUSINESS PRACTICES AND SYSTEMS 
Current 11Stovepipe" Maintenance Structure 
Figure 7.1 
The Navy has not agreed upon what the RMC end-state will look 
like and thus, is evolving as individual issues are debated and decided. Under 
the current structure the CNO owns the shipyards and the NADEPS. The CINCs 
own the 0- and 1-levels. It would seem that either the CNO or the CINCs should 
control Fleet maintenance and support It is evident that the Navy does not have 
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an organization that yet embraces the concept of seamless three level of 
maintenance [Ref. 27]. 
b. Pressures for restructuring, reinventing, and realigmnent 
It is important to be clear about the meaning of terms used when 
discussing organizational change. For the sake of this discussion, three types of 
changes are involved: restructuring, reinvention, and realignment Restructuring 
is cutting everything in the organization that does not contribute value to the 
services delivered to customers. Reinvention is strategic planning and market 
research to move the organization toward new service delivery modes and 
markets; reinvent the service market strategy. Realignment refers to changing 
the organizational structure at all levels to match the new market and service 
delivery strategy as a means for motivating management and employees. [Ref. 
28] 
Why do organizations restructure, reinvent, and realign 
themselves? In the last thirty years organizations typically have gone for fairly 
long periods of time with relatively little structural change but, then have 
experienced intervals of major restructuring. Organizations try to retain their 
existing form as long as possible to maintain internal consistency and to avoid 
upsetting the existing equilibrium and productivity. But, if the environment 
changes while the organization remains static, the structure gets more and more 
out of touch with the environment Eventually, the gap becomes so wide that 
the organization is forced to do a major overhaul. Restructuring, reinventing, 
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and realignment in this view, is like spring cleaning: we accumulate debris over 
months or years, and finally we have to face the mess. The stimulus or 
combination of stimuli that lead to restructuring, reinvention, and realignment 
include environmental changes, technology changes, significant resource 
reduction, organizational downsizing or ~~rightsizing", political changes, and 
leadership changes. [Ref. 26] 
c. Current trends 
The Cold War is over. The DoD and DoN budget is being reduced. 
Military bases are being closed as a result of the Commission on Base 
Realignment And Oosure. The Bottom-Up Review calls for reduced force 
structure and manpower. Also, the industrial age has given way to the age of 
Information technology. [Ref. 25] 
The dynamic changes in the world order have significant impact 
on the DoD and the U.S. Navy. The threat has changed, and the development of 
the Naval strategy 11From the Sea" reflects tactical and operational changes. 
Infrastructure realignment has just begun. The task is very dynamic and 
requires a thorough understanding of numerous factors. The most influential, 
and probably the least understood change factors, are the current and pending 
changes in federal legislation by Congress. The removal of the Full Time 
Equivalent (FTE) is intended to allow better and more appropriate personnel 
actions at Naval industrial activities. The work assignment issue is still 
hampered by the statutory requirement to retain sixty percent of the industrial 
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workload in public depots. Ongoing studies such as the Quadrennial Defense 
Review (QDR)-mandated by Congress in the 1997 Defense Authorization Act-
of "roles and missions" and the development of "core" workload requirements 
with associated, accurate workload levels are still in progress. 
Workload assignment obviously has major impact for Naval 
maintenance organizations. To compound the issue, a movement towards 
privatization and commercialization is gaining momentum. Maintenance 
transition cannot wait for legislation either to be rescinded or enacted. Rather, a 
degree of flexibility must be maintained so that congressional decisions can be 
better accommodated or guided by DoD policy. A proactive strategy is needed. 
In DoD, strategy and policy are constantly being evaluated. The most important 
resource, skilled personnel, is being downsized. Labor unions, through the 
President's Executive Order, are in receipt of pre-decisional information from 
the leaders of recognized bargaining units. DoD and the Office of Personnel 
Management have responded to identify needs regarding performance 
management and appraisal. Within the Navy, the skills, knowledge and abilities 
of our civilian work force are being recognized by integrating depot and ship 
artisans with sailors so that, through training and mentorship, a world class, 
integrated, high performance team of civilians and sailors can be developed to 
best serve the needs of the Fleet 
Technology will have a significant impact on the maintenance of 
current systems and the design of future systems. Oosing the gap on the cycle 
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time of technology introduction is extremely important Studies must be 
initiated and brought to closure, with analysis of alternatives resulting in 
decisions so that production can provide for timely benefit of technology before 
it becomes obsolete. Applications and processes appear to be in a state of 
constant change to meet and support improvements in weapon systems. 
Maintenance managers must better implement Reliability Centered 
Maintenance (RCM) and Engineering for reduced maintenance through focused 
engineering support organizations (SHAPEC & CF A), shop floor control and 
just-in-time material management Identification of cumbersome work practices, 
review of the technical authority process, continuous maintenance and 
integrated maintenance strategies, closer customer/ provider relationships, 
improved platform diagnostics, material initiatives, regional transportation and 
supply partnerships, and better repair versus replace analysis are some of the 
many ways to aide in solving the Navy recapitalization problem. 
A new industrial management structure will require customers and 
suppliers to be focused on Fleet support to insure no sacrifice of quality or 
schedule, while reducing costs. Regional maintenance requires a close review of 
current maintenance processes and business rules. Privatization and 
commercialization must be considered as alternatives to maintaining organic 
skills supporting key products. The recent military personnel homebasing 
initiative-an effort to assign E-4 to E-9 Sailors the maximum number of tours 
possible in the same geographic location to improve Sailors' quality of life, add 
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stability and increased expertise to the regions, improve retention, and reduce 
permanent change of station (PCS) funding requirements- impacts ashore 
military industrial support Competition may have a significant impact as other 
organizations, services or private sector companies challenge the maintenance 
system of the past Regionalization of maintenance provides the opportunity to 
assess new ways of providing products and services to the Fleet 
B. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
In FY 1996 Fleet maintenance funds were distributed to more than 120 
activities to accomplish depot and intermediate maintenance of ships and 
aircraft. From a critical point of view the current financial system does not 
appear to support informed decision making by Navy maintenance 
commanders. In some cases, the financial system actually motivates inefficient 
and costly near-term decisions; e.g., buying more capacity from the private 
sector when public capacity is available and must be paid for. The problem is 
not an issue of industrial funding versus mission funding. Industrial funding 
(DBOF) provides the necessary flexibility to handle contingencies associated 
with Fleet operations. Unfortunately, the DBOF also provides a mechanism for 
absorbing the cost of a variety of initiatives at the expense of current or future 
programs. Alternatively, managers of mission funded activities are not cost 
accountable for all of the resources they nmanage". Military personnel, facilities, 
utilities and plant equipment can be viewed as nfree," and therefore, are to be 
accumulated rather than efficiently managed. Such "in-kind" resources conceal 
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the true cost of products and services. In addition, the hardware commands 
and program managers make decisions that consume Fleet resourcesJ either in 
the near-term or long-termJ but frequently without coordination with the Fleet or 
the understanding that decisions impacting Fleet resources. ConverselyJ Fleet 
maintenance execution decisions may impact life cycle costs. 
Extraordinary effort is required to collect activity costs given the existing 
financial structure and accounting system capability. Most costs are 
retrospective. Individual maintenance managers and their chains of command 
do not have managerial accounting systems available to them that can address 
the u should costN or "is costing" questions that arise in assessing alternative 
courses of action. Some change is occurring in this regard. For exampleJ 
AIRPAC is moving towards a managerial accounting system to provide the 
capability to identifyJ compare and better manage the cost of Fleet products. 
The regional maintenance initiative provides a means to prototype the 
managerial accounting system that is needed to provide responsive and flexible 
decision making for a smaller and more austere Navy. 
The Bottom-Up ReviewJ completed in September 1993J calls for a smallerJ 
less expensiveJ and more efficient defense force structure. Because of the high 
priority placed on urightsizing" military structure and budgetJ the enormous 
defense support organization is also being proportionately re-aligned. Efficient 
financial management in both areasJ force operations and force support is 
critical. Due to the large share of Navy funds going to force supportJ it is 
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incumbent upon maintenance managers to identify actions that can be taken to 
reduce the cost of supporting today' s weapons to make more money available 
for recapitalization of Navy weapon systems. 
Each dollar spent on maintenance and support competes with 
requirements of operating forces. It is therefore imperative that financial 
management in support activities emphasize efficiency and cost control to 
maximize the resources available to the operating forces. 
AIMD North island receives funding for its maintenance support 
operations through the annual appropriations for Operations and Maintenance, 
Navy. This funding is a result of a complicated resource decision process: the 
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). 
1. Planning, Programming, and Budgeting 
Planning, Programming and Budgeting (PPBS) had its birth in the DoD in 
1962 under Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. In the simplest of terms, 
PPBS is a system designed to assist the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) in making 
choices about the allocation of resources among a number of competing or 
possible programs and alternatives to accomplish specific objectives in our 
national defense. In other words, the ultimate objective of PPBS is to provide 
operational commanders with the best mix of forces, equipment and support 
attainable within fiscal constraints. 
PPBS can be summarized in a few words. Based on the anticipated 
threat, a strategy is developed. Requirements of the strategy are then estimated 
91 
and programs are developed to package and execute the strategy. Finally, the 
costs of approved programs are budgeted in the sequence shown in Figure 7.2. 
[Ref. 29] 
THREAT~ STRATEGY~ REQUIREMENTS~ PROGRAMS~ BUDGET 
PPBS Formulation Steps 
Figure 7.2 
The PPBS concept was developed and installed by Charles J. Hitch, the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) under SECDEF McNamara, in the 
FY 1963 DoD budget. It was a revolutionary change, and introduced the concept 
of programming as a bridge between the already established functions of 
military planning and budgeting. [Ref. 30] 
PPBS differs from the traditional budgeting process which preceded it in 
two significant ways. First, in planning and programming PPBS tends to focus 
less on the existing base and more on the annual increments to it Also, it 
focuses more on objectives and purposes, and long-term alternative means for 
achieving them. Planning assesses the threat environment in the short and long 
term. Secondly, PPBS brings together planning and budgeting by means of 
programming, a process that essentially defines a procedure for distributing 
available resources among the many competing programs. 
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The PPBS has three distinct phases. 
a. Planning 
The first phase of PPBS begins with a review of the U. S. national 
security objectives, consideration of broad strategies for dealing with the threats 
to national security, and development of force structures and levels that will 
support those strategies. Following these steps is the development of defense-
wide policies with respect to manpower, logistics, acquisitions and functional 
areas. [Ref. 29] 
Planning elements are brought together under the general direction 
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. They represent the views of all the 
senior defense staff offices, including the various elements of the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the unified and 
specified commanders (CINCs) and affected staff elements of the military 
services and defense agencies. The broad elements of national security policy 
guidance are also derived in coordination with the National Security Council 
and the Office of Management and Budget [Ref. 29] 
The planning guidance that arises from this process is reviewed by 
the Defense Resources Board (DRB) to ensure that guidance represents realistic 
and executable direction. Upon completing the review, the Defense Planning 
Guidance (DPG) is signed out by the SECDEF to the military departments and 
defense agencies, with instructions to prepare and submit their Program 
Objectives Memorandum (POM) consistent with that guidance. [Ref. 29] 
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b. Programming 
Programming is the process by which information in the Defense 
Planning Guidance is translated into a financial plan of effective and achievable 
packages (programs). Programming produces a six-year program for each 
service component through development of a POM and a DoD data base called 
the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). The FYDP is a publication of 
decisions approved by SECDEF on DoD programs for a six-year period. It is an 
integrated and coordinated program document that displays forces, costs, 
manpower, procurement and construction in the approved programs. [Ref. 29] 
The POM is each Service's annual recommendation to SECDEF for 
the integrated application of their resources (forces, personnel, material, and 
dollars) over a six-year period. The most recent two years of the POM become 
part of the Presidenf s Budget submitted to Congress. [Ref. 29] 
c. Budgeting 
Budgeting is the final phase in the PPBS process. The budget 
expresses the financial requirements necessary to support approved programs 
developed during the planning and programming phases. It is through the 
budget that planning and programming are translated into annual funding 
requirements. The budgeting phase is completed when the President sends his 
budget (with DoD) input to Congress no later than the first Monday in February. 
[Ref. 29] 
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With the submission of the President's budget to Congress the next 
cycle of budget negotiation and enacbn.ent begins. The objective of budget 
negotiation and enacbn.ent is to authorize programs and appropriate funds. 
2 Appropriations 
Government operations are funded by the Congress by means of annual 
legislation known as Appropriation Acts. Each Appropriation Act must be 
accompanied by an Authorization Act The Authorization Act identifies and 
authorizes the purpose of programs. Appropriation provides the funding for 
programs. Once funding has been appropriated, budgets are executed by DoD 
and the Navy. 
The DoD Appropriation is one of thirteen government appropriations. 
The appropriations that provide funding to AIMD North Island are Operations 
and Maintenance Navy (O&MN), and Military Personnel, Navy (MPN). Figure 
7.3 shows the appropriation funding chain for AIMD North Island. 
a. Operations and Maintenance, Navy 
Operations and Maintenance, Navy (O&MN) provides the day-to-
day operations and maintenance funds for such varied areas as flight operations, 
ship and aircraft maintenance, and base operations support costs. In execution, 
funds are distributed to major claimants (i.e., CINCPACFLT). 
The O&MN appropriation is sub-divided into Budget Activities 
(BA) including Mission Forces, Depot Maintenance, and Other Support 
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including both air and surface force requirements for the activities under its 
cognizance. Depot maintenance is executed in total by Naval Aviation Systems 
Command (NAV AIR). Funding for aviation is passed by CINCP ACFLT to 
COMNAV AIRPAC to administer and execute. 
Funding for Naval air forces support flight training, aircraft 
operations and aircraft maintenance. Funds provide for fuel, oil, lubricants, 
consumable and depot level repair parts, replacement of flight clothing and 
emergency equipment, active duty military mission travel, miscellaneous 
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supplies for squadron operation, and operations of simulators and instrumented 
ranges used for crew training. 
Other Support funds base operations for both air and surface 
commands. This includes costs incurred- for administration of all command 
departments, maintenance and repair of real property, utilities, communications, 
galley and bachelor quarters operations, automatic data processing, travel, 
minor and plant property equipment, civilian labor, transportation equipment 
operation and maintenance, airfield operations, recruiting, advertising, 
management headquarters. The Activity Group (AG), Other Base Operations 
Support, within the Other Support BA includes funding for AIMDs. 
An Annual Planning Figure (APF) represents the target level of 
total funding a command may plan to receive for the fiscal year within its 
operating budget An Operating Budget (OB) for CINCPACFLT is composed of 
funding for Mission Forces and Other Support Separate APFs are issued for 
each BA within the OB. APFs may be issued by CINCPACFLT either before or 
after the beginning of the fiscal year, depending on many variables including the 
nature of the BA and whether the Appropriations Act is approved by Congress 
before the start of the fiscal year. 
OB holders are responsible for execution of a viable financial plan, 
not dependent on additional funding from their major claimant, and maintained 
within their assigned APFs. 
97 
3. Unit Cost Concept 
a. Principles 
Unit cost is the foundation upon which the revolving fund concept 
operates. The primary goal of the unit cost process is to give managers the 
ability to determine and evaluate all the business costs of producing an output 
In principle, reduced costs and increased productivity can be achieved through 
cost visibility and a focus on the mission. [Ref. 29] 
First, an output must be identified to be able to assign costs. The 
unit cost system emphasizes using an objective measurement of the output by 
relating it directly to the primary mission of the activity. Although this system 
emphasizes a measurable output, it also recognizes that some outputs cannot be 
easily measured and must be treated as a level of effort [Ref. 29] 
The term unit cost per output is based on the concept that each cost 
incurred by a unit cost activity will find its way into some output The goal is to 
have a cost identified for each output as accurately as possible so that as 
workload fluctuates, the revenue and costs.remain in balance. [Re£ .. 29] 
b. Tenns 
Outputs are subcategorized into primary and other outputs. A 
primary output reflects the primary mission of a unit cost activity. It is 
importune to have as few primary outputs identified as possible to avoid 
fragmenting the organization and defeating the purpose of managing total costs. 
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Outputs that have no workload measure, or outputs that do no relate to the 
primary output measure, are considered other outputs. [Ref. 29] 
The cost of every product or service output consists of direct, 
indirect, and general and administrative (G&A) costs. Direct costs are those that 
are clearly associated with a product or output such as parts or direct labor. 
Indirect costs, such as shop supervisors, are those mission costs that cannot be 
identified to a single output, thus are allocated over a select number of outputs. 
G&A expenses are overhead costs that cannot readily be associated to any 
particular output and are arbitrarily allocated to all outputs or products. G&A 
costs usually include such functions as local command and control personnel, 
comptroller, installation security, facilities engineering, custodial services, 
entomology services, or other common support functions provided as part of the 
base operations. [Ref. 29] 
All costs required to make a product or give a service are totaled 
and then divided by workload units produced to determine actual unit cost or 
cost per unit This approach includes all direct costs of production and costs 
associated with the infrastructure that supports an activity in the unit cost The 
objective is to highlight the cost drivers, or those activities that result in costs 
being incurred. Cost drivers are then evaluated to determine whether they add 
value to an output or result in improved customer support. [Ref. 29] 
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c. Implementation 
Customer demand is the factor that determines output quantity. 
The DoD Comptroller sets the unit cost targets at the service level based on 
recommendations of the service components. The manager's primary function is 
to ensure that the DBOF activity provides goods and services at or below the 
stipulated unit cost This ties funding levels directly to outputs. Instead of a 
guaranteed budget level, obligations are limited to a predetermined unit cost 
target times a defined output. [Refs. 29] 
All of an activity's costs are allocated to primary output(s) through 
the cost accounting system. From this information, the activity can establish a 
unit cost per selected output. Through the budget formulation process, 
activities propose and are issued a unit cost goal or several unit cost goals for 
activities with multiple outputs. The unit cost goal is determined by dividing 
total budgeted costs by budgeted workload (outputs). The unit cost goal is what 
the activity tries to meet during actual execution. Rates or prices for customers 
are also set based on the unit cost goal. The unit cost goal times the budgeted 
workload gives the unit cost activity its earned authority or cost authority. At 
the end of the year, the earned authority is compared to actual total costs. If the 
earned authority is more than actual costs, the activity has made a profit. If 
earned authority is less than actual costs, they incurred a loss. The profit or loss 
will be taken into account when establishing next year's unit cost goal. [Ref. 29] 
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Unit costing is based on the relationship of resources consumed to 
output produced. The system seeks to have each product or output bear the cost 
as accurately as possible. Savings can only happen if processes are changed or 
eliminated and the effects of these changes result in a lower actual cost per 
output [Ref. 29] 
Unit cost can apply to appropriated activities. Future budgets are 
derived by applying a unit cost allocation to future output levels for 
appropriated activities. fustead of receiving a fixed operating budget, 
appropriated funded activities are resourced based on a unit cost goal times a 
budgeted level of outputs. This resource allocation method is known as unit 
cost resourdng. A baseline unit cost is determined at a fixed level of output and 
applied to a future output level. The future output level, whether expressed as 
budget or workload, may or may not be the same as in previous years. Under 
unit cost resourcing, appropriated activities "earn'' their budgets based on the 
level of outputs produced. [Ref. 29] 
Unit cost and unit cost resourcing embody sound management 
principles, consistent with modern business practices. Managing with unit cost 
information empowers managers, but does not make management decisions. 
Using unit cost is not a substitute for informed management However, 
enlightened managers understand the usefulness of unit cost information. 
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d. Disadvantages 
As with any new way of doing business, implementing and using a 
unit cost system has some potential pitfalls. The following are three problem 
areas of the unit cost system in the DoD: [Refs. 25, 29, and 30] 
• The 11Death Spiral" of Demand. Under a unit cost system, budgets 
and corresponding unit cost goals are based on a projected number of 
outputs or work units. If the projection is not realized, it could cause 
the activity to exceed its unit cost goal and result in a negative Net 
Operating Result (NOR). Since operating losses must be recovered in 
future year rates, the unit prices that the activity charge its customers 
will increase. As prices increase, customers will economize and seek 
out alternate sources or reduce the number of units purchased. If units 
produced continues to decline, the activity will have to spread fixed 
costs and overhead costs over fewer units driving up the prices even 
more. Theoretically, this spiral continues until the activity is no longer 
viable and goes out of business or an external financing source makes 
up the operating losses, eliminating the spiraling price effect. 
Accurately predicting workload and production units is essential to 
making a unit cost system work. Even then, workload sometimes does 
not materialize due to factors beyond the control of the activity; 
• All costs are variable costs. Unit cost systems have a tendency to treat 
all costs as variable with no distinction made between the fixed and 
variable portions of total costs. Mangers should be aware of the level 
of fixed costs within their activities, because the percentage of fixed 
costs could have a large impact upon future funding levels. For 
example, under a unit cost resourcing scheme, an activity with 
relatively large fixed costs would generally receive excess funding as 
output increased. However, as output is decreased, that same activity 
may find it difficult to meet mission requirements when those large 
fixed costs are unitized over a smaller output. Likewise, an activity 
with a relatively smaller portion of total costs being fixed, should no 
expect to see as much variation in funding levels. This is provided 
that the output is in some relevant range where variable costs are not 
changing significantly. 
• Disregarding marginal costs. Unit cost pricing may make costs 
higher than commercial alternatives. This can happen because 
commercial activities operate on a contribution margin, not solely on 
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average unit cost Information regarding the change in marginal cost 
at different levels of output is required to make efficient management 
decisions. Without the appropriate marginal cost information, 
decisions could be made that could lead to higher rather than lower 
total program costs. The ultimate objective of unit cost is achievement 
of economic efficiency through minimizing total program costs. In an 
environment of declining resources, managerial efficiency is an 
important factor in how resources are allocated in a unit cost system. 
4. The Defense Business Operations Fund 
a. Introduction 
The Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF) is a revolving fund 
authorized by specific provision of law to finance a continuing cycle of 
operations. This fund concept fulfills the needs of management in regards to 
timely, accurate, and reliable information concerning costs and 
accomplishments. 
Properly designed and implemented cost accounting systems are of 
great value to management to control costs. The complexities of modern 
production techniques and the large volume of transactions involved in 
maintaining sophisticated weapon systems have made high-speed and high-
capacity automatic data processing systems absolutely essential for providing 
timely and accurate management information. 
The cyclical concept inherent in the DBOF operation provides for 
the return of capital investment through billing of customers. Costs for services 
are identified to the specific ordering activities and are subsequently billed 
against the funds provided. During the time that work is in process on a given 
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project or job, the customer is billed (termed 'progress billing") for actual direct 
costs plus an estimated (applied) overhead expense recovery amount. Upon 
completion of the project or job, the customer is billed (termed "final billing'') 
the previously negotiated fixed price amount or, in the case of cost reimbursable 
orders, the value of the actual hours multiplied by the negotiated direct and 
indirect rates. The variance between the final billing and the actual cost incurred 
is taken as a gain or loss to accumulated operating results. 
The intent of industrial fund financing and accounting is to 
introduce, to a large extent, many of the incentives and practices prevalent in 
private enterprise. The DBOF System provides a wealth of information upon 
which to base judgements and from which can be derived data necessary for 
effective review and control of costs and operations. In times of austere funding 
and increased demand for economy and efficiency of operations, the industrial 
fund system is intended to afford managers the means for attaining optimum 
results and achieving realistic goals through the application of proven business 
techniques. The inherent flexibility of the fiscal structure facilitates the financing 
of peak loads and permits controlled retrenchment during slack periods. 
In summary, the DBOF utilizes commercial accounting techniques 
to provide a service to management which permits the Commanding Officer to 
control internal operations through the medium of the accounting system. 
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b. Background 
The Navy had a revolving fund as early as 1878. Modem day 
revolving fund authority is provided by the National Security Act of 1947, as 
amended (Title 10 U.S.C. section 2208) that allows the Secretary of Defense to 
establish revolving funds as a means of more effectively controlling the cost of 
the work performed by the DoD. The Navy Industrial Fund was established at 
the Naval Aviation Depots in 1962. DoD established the DBOF or Fund, on 
October 1, 1991. It encompasses all branches of DoD. In the Navy, the Fund 
includes shipyards, aviation depots, ordnance plants, ammunition depots, 
weapons facilities, research and development laboratories, printing plants, 
public works centers, missile facilities, test centers, and others. The Depot Fund 
consists of an initial allocation of cash from the United States Treasury; accounts 
receivable; inventories of materials and supplies, work-in-process, and other 
current assets; subject to liabilities assumed at inception plus those subsequently 
incurred in support of current operations. 
Many of the basic tools of dynamic management are included in 
the DBOF System. It employs the commercial-type system of accounting, with 
production and overhead-type job orders for accumulating labor and material 
costs by performing or benefiting cost centers, and use of standards of 
performance and cost DBOF uses accrual accounting, i.e., a system that records 
transactions in the same period in which they occur. It has a commercial-type 
balance sheet and income and expense statement for reporting current status of 
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the fund and results of operations. The budgetary system is linked to the 
accounting system to enable plant managers to follow the course of operations 
and provide a logical and reliable means of measuring progress against plans. 
c. Objectives of the Fund 
The DBOF concept has three important features that are intended 
to encourage better management and stimulate efficiency similar to private 
industry: 
• Contractual Relationship. 
a) A contractual relationship is created between the customer and 
the producer (NADEP), causing the producer to accurately 
define all tasks to be accomplished, to accurately forecast all 
costs associated with these tasks, and to quote the customer a 
fixed price in most cases. 
b) The customer must provide funds for the cost of their 
requirements just as when they buy from commercial firms. As 
a result, the customer is motivated to order only those items 
and services for which there is a real need. 
• Identifying Costs for Specific Jobs. Cost accounting employed by 
DBOF activities enables management to identify costs to a particular job. This identification is essential to: 
a) Establishing management control of costs 
b) Developing standards for pricing 
c) Providing a means of projecting realistic budgets based on 
expected future workloads 
d) Providing a means of measuring efficiency since all work 
performed is expressed in one common denominator-dollars. 
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• Flexibility of Revolving Fund. A revolving fund provides flexibility 
to utilize dollars as operationally required. Money is centralized 
under local jurisdiction. 
a) While the reason for adopting a DBOF System was to create an 
environment conducive to more responsible and efficient 
management, the DBOF System is no more effective than the 
manager's ability to use the tools it provides. Therefore, it is 
very important that the Depot manager be familiar with the 
financial operation and accounting employed in the DBOF. 
The desired benefit is that the DBOF reimbursable concept will 
increase cost visibility to both the customer and provider, and that both are 
better able to make informed decisions as a consequence. The goal of DBOF is to 
produce a management structure that provides incentives to managers and 
employees of DoD business organizations to provide products and services at 
the lowest cost For the customer, reduced production costs translate to reduced 
prices. This enables the customer to more effectively accomplish assigned 
missions within the resources available. 
d. Concept 
DBOF is a revolving cash management fund and not a physical 
entity or corporation. It functions as an accounting and financing mechanism, 
much like appropriated funds are a financing mechanism. However, unlike the 
allocation of funding in the Resource Management System driven by 
appropriations, activities financed by the DBOF do not receive an annual 
appropriation. Instead, they receive unit cost goals and earn cost authority for 
the amount of every customer order accepted. As DBOF activities accept these 
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orders and perform work for their customers, they use cash in the DBOF to pay 
for their costs. Customers are then billed based on stabilized rates and the 
customers reimburse the DBOF. This revolving cycle continues, hence the DBOF 
is considered a revolving fund. 
The DBOF combines individual revolving funds into a single 
revolving working capital fund. This initial capital funding was started by 
Congress with a funding corpus. When a customer needs a service performed, 
they submit a customer order to the activity to perform the services. The activity 
finances the cost of the material, personnel, and any other costs to start the work. 
The customer is billed when the work is completed or as it is being completed. 
The customer then pays the bill by reimbursing the working capital fund. Prices 
for goods and services produced set on a break-even basis over the long-term. 
[Ref. 29] 
Each DBOF activity submits an operating budget and a capital 
budget Separation of capital investments and operating costs provides 
management with increased visibility and identification of operating and capital 
costs and identifies total cost of the business area. 
DBOF activities incur costs differently than appropriation funded 
activities. Instead of receiving a funding document that provides fixed budget 
authority for a specified period of time, the amount of orders from customers 
determines the earned cost authority of each DBOF provider. Each DBOF 
activity manager is expected to hold costs within the product of the approved 
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unit cost goals times the actual work load or number of work units produced. 
DBOF managers can make trade-off decisions to minimize costs and maximize 
output 
The DBOF is composed of the business areas that were included 
with the old industrial funds, stock funds and some additional Defense Agency 
functions determined to be to utilize the DBOF business management approach. 
Navy related business areas absorbed in the Fund through FY95 included: 
• Base Support 
• Depot Maintenance 
• Distribution Depots 
• Information Services 
• Logistics Support 
• Printing 
• Research and Development 
• Supply Management 
• Transportation 
e. Link to customer budgets 
During budget formulation, Components are responsible for 
balancing DBOF business area budgets with the customers' appropriated budget 
requirements. Components develop proposed budgets for both appropriated 
fund activities and DBOF business areas and submit them to the Under Secretary 
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of Defense, Comptroller (USD (q) for review. Customers determine and justify 
their anticipated requirements for goods and services and levels of performance 
they require from the DBOF business areas to fulfill mission objectives. 
Customer budgets are developed using projected rates and prices published by 
the DBOF business areas. Because the customer-financing mechanism exerts a 
controlling influence on the size of the DBOF business areas, it is essential that 
customers identify and submit accurate budget requests to their component 
headquarters. If customers inaccurately state their requirements for DBOF-
financed goods and services, they may receive insufficient appropriated funds to 
meet mission requirements. 
On the DBOF side, inaccurate customer requirements data could 
cause managers to inappropriately "size" the DBOF' s business area operations 
(e.g., personnel, overhead, material, operating and capital budgets). Because 
DBOF business areas cannot ilresize" their infrastructures "overnight'' to 
accommodate significant changes in customer orders, having good projections of 
requirements enables business operations to successfully meet their customers' 
needs in a timely manner. 
f. Budgeting at depot maintenance activities 
Annual operating budgets are submitted as mandated by OMB 
Circular A-11. Depot maintenance activity budgets are developed in accordance 
with USD (q guidance, as perpetuated in DoD 7000.14R (Financial Management 
Regulation) volumes 2A and 2B and NA VCOMPT NOTE 7111. The DBOF 
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budget contains both an operating budget section and a capital budget section. 
The operating budget section contains the unit cost and all operating expenses. 
The capital budget contains the amounts for depreciable capital investments. 
Depreciation expenses are factored into the rates charged to DBOF customers 
and are reflected in the operating budget section of the annual operating budget 
Depot maintenance activities electronically transmit their budgets 
directly to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and 
Comptroller) (ASN (FM&q) into the Navy Industrial Fund Reporting System 
(NIFRS). ASN (FM&q operates the NIFRS and maintains a budget and 
execution data base for use by management commands, ASN (FM&q 
evaluations, and DoN and USD (q budget formulation and reporting. 
g. Billing for custmner work 
NADEP employs two methods for billing customers for work 
accomplished: cost reimbursable and fixed price. Both are used to recover total 
costs incurred in support of a customer orders. Differences between the two 
methods hinge on the activity's ability to adhere to previously budgeted 
estimates and on the degree of risk it is will to accept 
The cost reimbursable approach essentially involves accumulating 
direct, indirect, and G&A costs in such a manner as to allow progressive 
charging of costs to a customer as work is accomplished. Work in support of 
nonfederal government entities, such as local governments and foreign military 
sales, all charges are calculated based on actual costs. 
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The fixed price customer order approach involves an agreement 
between an activity and its customer to perform specific work for a specific fixed 
price. These customer orders normally evolve from negotiations between the 
customer and the activity. 
Under both cost reimbursable and fixed price, the charge to the 
customer is intended to be based on a stabilized rate per unit plus actual costs 
incurred for items like direct contracts and materials. Charges to customers by 
either approach are either based on inputs to or outputs of the process. Inputs 
would include such factors as hours worked or materials consumed while 
outputs would include products or services produced. 
It is worth noting that for non-supply DBOF activities there is no 
national output pricing system. The price charged for a standard productive 
process in a Depot Maintenance activity on the East Coast is not the same as 
charged on the West Coast Given similar efficiencies for inputs and similar 
sizes for two activities, their charges to customers vary based upon the cost of 
inputs including regional wage scales, regional raw material costs, and regional 
utility costs. Each activity seeks to recover its own costs independently. 
h. Stabilized rates 
The OSD performs the vital functions of controlling the DBOF, 
approving unit cost rates and establishing the #stabilized rate." The stabilized 
rate is the rate that customers must pay for services acquired from DBOF 
activities. This brings the full cost of providing a service in view of the customer 
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and provides an incentive to procure services only when needed and at the best 
rate possible. 
The stabilized rate is a compilation of a charge for services plus or 
minus a surcharge to bring the DBOF back to a break-even status. For example, 
if the Fund has collected profits and is over its desired level, OSD will reduce the 
stabilized rate so that customers enjoy the return of the profits. Similarly, if the 
Fund is under the desired level then the stabilized rate is increased to make up 
the losses through increased customer payments. 
The principle objective of stabilized rates is to shelter DoD 
customers from wide price variances due to cost escalation (inflation) as 
compared to budgeted prices. This allows DoD and the Navy to better manage 
execution of its programs. DBOF rates charged for services are based upon the 
DBOF portion of the President's Budget 
Individual activities construct their budget submissions during 
early spring and submit these budgets together with proposed rates to their 
Management Commands (i.e., NA V AIR). The budgets are reviewed and 
adjusted by the Management Commands during May and June, then submitted 
to ASN (FM&C) before going to DoD in September. DoD reviews these budgets 
and makes adjustments right up to the end of December at which point they are 
incorporated into the President's budget for submission to Congress in January. 
Original rates proposed by the activities, during the April time frame, have to be 
modified to incorporate changes made by Management Commands, ASN 
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(FM&q, and USD (q. This update is normally accomplished in early spring of 
the following year. Consequently, stabilized rates are not announced to 
customers until the April/May timeframe, which hinders the budget planning 
process. 
Since Navy customer budgets are priced from the #bottom up," it is 
important to note that the DBOF rates for the President's Budget are not 
available to customers when the President's Budget is being prepared. Rather, 
they become available a year later, in time for the construction of the 
apportionment year column of the next year's President's Budget 
While ASN (FM&q tries to balance customer and DBOF activity 
funding in the President's Budget, the process in reality is managed at a level 
much further beyond that of the local customer budget The imbalances that 
inevitably occur come to light in apportionment In effect, although the program 
stabilizes rates almost two years ahead of time, stabilization for the local activity 
level customer happens a year later than is needed to program its goal 
efficiently. 
The essence of rate stabilization is that annual rates are set for the 
entire fiscal year. The result of combining rate stabilization and activity 
budgeting has created a situation wherein the rates ultimately charged reflect 
modifications by the Management Commands, ASN (FM&q, and USD (q. As 
a consequence, individual DBOF activity commanders have lost the ability to 
directly determine or change rates once an error has been observed in execution. 
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In fact, DBOF activities are told what factors to employ during budget 
construction and subsequently modify rates prior to execution. 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter has examined the Navy maintenance organizational 
structure and financial management policy, and aspects of each that are 
impeding progress in the effort to consolidate the calibration laboratories at NAS 
North Island. The traditional platform-based organizational structure and 
maintenance strategies were analyzed. It was shown how the "split job 
responsibility'' approach does not fit the decentralized RMC model consisting of 
RRCs that provide repair service to multiple platforms. Additionally, the two 
funding and accounting systems were described and how cumbersome and 
inefficient it is to operate and manage maintenance with both mission and DBOF 
funding at a consolidated RRC. It is important to note that the current 
accounting systems make it nearly impossible to provide an accurate cost benefit 
analysis regarding consolidation thus, the current financial system does not 
appear to support informed decision making. 
The final chapter will summarize the findings of this thesis, present 
conclusions based on the findings, and give recommendations in regard to 
consolidation of the calibration laboratories at NAS North Island and further 
research required to realize the full benefits of Regional Maintenance. 
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Vlll. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis has analyzed the present state of the consolidation effort 
between the Naval Aviation Depot and Aircraft futerm.ediate Maintenance 
Department calibration laboratories at North Island, CA. In doing so, the 
benefits, actual and potential, as well as the drawbacks, of collocation and 
consolidation have been compared. The analysis has centered on the two 
primary issues impeding full integration of the calibration laboratories into a 
Regional Repair Center: the Navy maintenance culture and organizational 
command structure; and the differences in funding sources and accounting 
systems. The following is a summary of our findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations for follow-on research. 
A. FINDINGS 
1. Manpower Reductions 
The total number of military and civilian calibration technicians has 
decreased as a result of consolidating AIMD Miramar and North Island 
calibration laboratories. Nine military and eleven civilian billets were 
eliminated from Miramar, of which North Island gained one billet to increase to 
24 technicians. Although not in the calibration laboratory, the eleven civilians 
were rehired at NADEP North Island. There were no personnel reductions as a 
result of the collocating AIMD and NADEP North Island calibration 
laboratories. 
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2. Training Enhanced 
The consolidated !-level site exposes technicians to components from a 
larger variety of aircraft since a singleJ larger calibration laboratory is servicing 
aircraft from more than one Naval Air StationJ rather than just the components 
peculiar to the aircraft serviced by an individual AIMD. NADEP artisans are 
providing informal on-the-job training to the military technicians. This u cross-
trainingu better prepares the military technicians to accomplish the mission at 
sea. If formal training is desiredJ the requirement must be included in the depot 
artisansJ position description (PD). 
3. Calibration Standards Reduced 
The number of calibration standards between AIMD Miramar and North 
Island was reduced approximately five percent as a result of their consolidation. 
The disposition of the standards is not knownJ therefore actual dollar savings 
from their inactivation or disposal could not be identified. The number of 
standards did not change as a result of the collocation of AIMD and NADEP 
North Island. 
4. Facilities Not Streamlined 
As a result of BRAC 1995J the Navy is moving out of NAS Miramar and 
the Marines are moving into Marine Corp Air Station Miramar. The facility that 
housed the calibration laboratory at AIMD North Island is being used by other 
divisions within AIMD. The NADEP calibration facility floor space is more 
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efficiently utilized as a result of collocating the I and D-level calibration 
laboratories; facility modifications were not required to accommodate the 1-level 
calibration laboratory. 
5. Unchanged Responsiveness 
The consolidation of AIMD Miramar and North Island and collocation to 
NADEP North Island has been transparent to their customers. There is a single 
indication of productivity improvement, as the AIMD backlog of TIU-205s has 
been reduced. Tum-around-times have neither increased nor decreased. 
6. Automated Information System Inadequacies 
AIMD and NADEP each utilize various and different data bases and 
information systems, therefore it is difficult for them to share technical and 
management data. This fragmentation of data and information systems is 
inefficient and inadequate to support Regional Maintenance. 
7. Two Chains of Command 
Although the I- and D-level calibration laboratories have collocated, each 
has maintained a distinct and separate internal chain of command. In this 
respect, no change (streamlining) has occurred in maintenance management as a 
result of Regional Maintenance. 
8. Two Funding Sources and Accounting Systems 
NADEP North Island is a DBOF activity and is funded by NA V AIR. 
AIMD North Island is mission funded and receives appropriated funding from 
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CINCPACFLT. All personnel interviewed said they would prefer one type of 
funding. Extraordinary effort is required to collect activity costs given the 
existing financial structure and accounting system capability. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. The Environment of Regional Maintenance Implementation 
Regional Maintenance is not occurring in a vacuum. Other dynamics 
such as BRAC and Fleet reductions makes it difficult to state, with any precision, 
how much of the reductions are due to regional maintenance. It is very difficult 
to isolate benefits and costs of regional maintenance because, in terms of 
infrastructure and billets, there are several related dynamics at play including 
Base Realignment and Oosure, in which fifty percent of the Navy shipyards and 
NADEPs will be closed, as well as tender drawdown, and Regional 
Maintenance. 
2. Where are the Savings? 
Unless buildings are leased, sold, or demolished after they are vacated 
due to RMC there will be no significant cost savings or avoidances. Similarly, 
true savings cannot be realized if personnel are redistributed throughout the 
Navy and DoD. Billets (military and civilian) must be cut and personnel 
discharged. Excess equipment must be deactivated or disposed if savings are to 
be realized from consolidation of maintenance capacity. If the Navy takes the 
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savings and redistributes them during the PPBS process, then there is no 
reduction in the Navy Total Obligation Authority, and hence no true savings. 
3. Military Shore billets are Critical to the Navy Mission 
Maintaining sufficient shore billets to support sea-shore rotation is critical 
to the retention and enhancement of sailor technical skills, quality of life, and 
contribution to fleet material readiness. Military billets within a region should 
not exceed the sea-shore rotation needs of the afloat Navy. All things 
considered, where workload exceeds the capacity of military maintenance 
personnel ashore, civilian personnel could be assigned or the maintenance 
outsourced. However, extreme care must be exercised in identifying excess 
manpower capacity so as not to eliminate too many key shore billets. 
4. Military Resiliency is Decreased 
Collocation and consolidation of maintenance facilities will leave 
geographical areas more susceptible to a larger loss in the event of a disaster 
(i.e., fire, earthquake). Although this should not halt implementation of 
regional maintenance, it should be considered and contingency planning should 
take place accordingly. 
5. Distinction between I and D-levels Blurred 
Under a consolidated management structure, the distinction between l-
and D-levels become blurred. While this may be intended by the Regional 
Maintenance Concept, it could cause problems. The Naval Aviation 
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Maintenance Program (NAMP) is based on three distinct levels of maintenance, 
each with a different level of capability. Of which, I-level is key to Navy 
forward deployment and sustainment RMC decisions may, inadvertently, 
violate NAMP business rules. Each platform has a different maintenance 
strategy and operates under a specific set of rules. Regionalization of 
maintenance will proceed only when these communities can be assured of the 
level of support that they currently enjoy. 
6. No Cost Visibility 
The current financial system does not appear to support informed 
decision making by Navy maintenance commanders. DBOF provides the 
necessary flexibility to handle contingencies associated with Fleet operations, but 
unfortunately, it also provides a mechanism for absorbing the cost of a variety of 
initiatives at the expense of current or future programs. Individual maintenance 
managers and their chains of command do not have managerial accounting 
systems available to them that can address the "should cost'' or ~~is costing'' 
questions that arise in assessing alternative courses of action. The lack of cost 
visibility, can, and does, lead to some choices that appear to be good for the 
customer, but are actually the more expensive option for the Navy and the 
taxpayer. The existing system does not provide sufficient cast and decision 
accountability. 
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7. Philosophical Differences and Parochialism 
Philosophical differences among the warfighting communities and 
organizational parochialism are complicating efforts to implement Regional 
Maintenance, and hence the end-state continues to evolve. The participants in 
Regional Maintenance have been identified (i.e., aviation, ship, and submarine 
communities) but, the exact nature and level of participation of each has not The 
chain of command for decision and control on regional maintenance issues is 
often clouded with guidance and tasking coming from outside the traditional 
chain of command. Without clear guidance from their chains of command, it is 
difficult to get cooperation and participation on regional maintenance initiatives. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Theoretically, there are scale economies to be achieved from consolidating 
the I and D-level calibration laboratories into a Regional Repair Center at NAS 
North Island. Although the previously listed findings may project a uglass half 
empty'' viewpoint, calibration laboratories are an area where Navy Maintenance 
can be more effective, efficient, and economical. Consolidating redundant 
calibration laboratories can provide benefits and savings to the Navy if vacated 
facilities are leased, sold, or demolished, billets are cut based on workload 
requirements, excess calibration standards are deactivated or salvaged, and by 
process improvements. However, before successful consolidation can be 
achieved and benefits realized, a consistent budgetary process is necessary and 
the issue of command and control should be resolved. 
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Following is a list of areas requiring further research to assist in 
determining the advisability of changing the existing system of Naval 
Maintenance and resolving the impediments to implementation of RMC. 
• RMC and Title 10 issues: 
a) Section 2464 requires that DoD maintain logistics capability-
including personnel, equipment, and facilities-to ensure a 
ready and controlled source of technical competence and 
resources necessary for an effective and timely response to 
mobilization, national defense contingency situations, and other 
emergency requirements; 
b) Section 2466 (60/40 law) requires no more than forty percent of 
the funds made available in a fiscal year to a military 
department or Defense Agency may be used to contract for the 
performance by non-Federal Government personnel. The 
blurring of the distinction between maintenance levels 
associated with regional maintenance could make this provision 
problematic. Similarly, changing current funding structures 
could amplify this problem; 
c) Section 2469 requires public/private competition if depot-level 
workload, valued in excess of 3 million dollars is to be moved 
from a public to a private source of repair and merit based 
procedures if workload is to be moved between Navy organic 
depots. Blurring of the levels of maintenance could lead to 
problems if 1-level workload, performed at a depot, is really 1-
level and not subject to these provisions; 
d) Section 2216 requires SECDEF to maintain the separate identity 
of each fund and activity managed through DBOF that was 
managed as a separate fund or activity before the establishment 
of the Fund. 
Research is required in these areas to assess the impact Title 10 has on RMC. 
• Unit Costs and Mission Funding: A core management requirement 
for any business is the ability to know the costs associated with 
producing a product or service. It is very difficult and labor intensive 
to extrapolate cost data at mission funded activities and is one of the 
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reasons for moving toward DBOF. The current initiatives to improve 
cost visibility at mission funded activities should be studied and the 
feasibility of using only mission funding for RRCs. 
• Accounting System Compatibility: Mission funding verses DBOF-
which is right for RMC? It is inefficient and cumbersome to operate 
and manage RRCs under two financial systems. Are either of the two 
current systems better suited for Regional Maintenance or should both 
be maintained? If one is, what types of changes would be necessary to 
migrate to the single financial system. 
• Automated Information Systems: Study the current maintenance 
management data systems and feasibility of migration to a fully 
compatible system with common data elements. 
• Management of Re!tional Maintenance: Management of Navy 
maintenance is currently accomplished within the several platform 
u stovepipes", relying heavily on the Systems Commands to provide 
support, control and maintenance strategies with which to articulate 
and control basic platform modernization, configuration and 
maintenance requirements. RMC calls for Systems Commands to 
realign and interface the requisite support and control mechanisms at 
all stages and levels of the integrated Fleet maintenance management 
modeL What are the possible end states for command and control of 
Navy Maintenance under RMC and which best meets the current 
requirements from each platform area. 
• RMC and Life Cycle Costs: How does RMC affect life cycle costs of 
Navy weapon systems? The NAMP employs three levels of 
maintenance, each with a different level of capability. Whereas, 
surface ship maintenance capitalizes upon multiple alternative repair 
sites, each capable of meeting fleet requirements. Aviation 
maintenance policy is designed to minimize life-cycle weapon system 
support costs. Although it appears that the surface fleet can reduce 
support costs through RMC, what is the impact on aviation life cycle 
support costs where rules currently exists to reduce redundancy 
between the different levels of maintenance? 
• RMC and Level of Repair Analysis: How does RMC affect the 
current Level of Repair Analysis (LORA) in the weapon acquisition 
process? In aviation maintenance, it is decided during the Logistic 
Support Analysis and Maintenance Planning early in the weapons 
system acquisition cycle, where an item is going to be sent when it 
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needs repair based on numerous factors including capability, turn-
around-time, and costs. Resources are specifically tailored to the 
workload anticipated at each I- and D-level maintenance activity, and 
are prepositioned only at the designated activities according to the 
approved Integrated Logistic Support Plans. Regional Maintenance 
blurs the boundaries between I- and D-level repair. How does the 
notion of u one level of maintenance ashore" affect u pre-brokering" of 
aviation maintenance? 
• Potential Resrlonal Repair Centers: the following repair areas should 
be studied to determine the feasibility of consolidating redundant and 
excess capacity and the potential benefits that can be realized by 
establishing a RRC for each under RMC. 
a) Diesel engine and small boat repair 
b) Air Conditioning and Refrigeration CFC Removal 
c) Antennae Repair 
d) Avionics /Micro-miniature Repair 
e) Automated Test Equipment 
f) Corrosion Control 
g) Cryptographic Equipment Repair 
h) Electro-plating 
i) Electric Motor Rewind 
j) Flexible Hose Repair and Fabrication 
k) Machine Shops 
I) Hoist Repair, Weight Testing and Re-Certification 
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APPENDIX A 
NADEP FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSffiiLffiES 
Generally, NADEPs are organized as matrix organizations. Functions 
can be thought of as imposed across the horizontal axis while the Program 
Management Team responsibilities cut through the organization across the 
vertical axis. Each functional manager provides services (manpower) to the 
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NADEPs operate with both military and civilian personnel. The military 
billets are at the management level above the department level and report 
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directly to the Commanding Officer (CO) and Executive Officer (XO). 
The command level is the first major element of organization followed by 
the departments. Each department is subdivided into divisions, branches, 
sections (if necessary), units (known as service departments) or shops 
(production department) in descending order. The organization structure is 
shown in Figure A.2. 
1. Commanding Officer (CO) 
The Commanding Officer (CO) is charged by COMNAVAIRSYSCOM to 
accomplish the mission and directing the operations of the NADEP. 
2. Executive Officer (XO) 
The Executive Officer (XO) assists the CO in performing command duties and 
supervises the overall functions of the depot through subordinate positions. The 
XO also determines apportionment of military billet allowances and is 
responsible for supervising efforts and promoting harmony and cooperation 
throughout the organization. 
3. Legal Counsel Office (00700) 
The Legal Counsel Office provides legal services, including business and 
commercial law, to the command and its field activities. 
4. Occupational Safety and Health Officer (00600) 
The Occupational Safety and Health Officer acts as special assistant and 
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comprehensive Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Program (excluding 
aviation safety). The program includes, but is not limited to, interpretation of 
safety standards, ensure safe work methods, perform safety inspections on 
equipment, accident prevention, investigation, and analysis, education and 
training programs, liaise with the aviation safety officer, and manage the Navy 
Occupational Safety and Health Deficiency Abatement Program and Hazardous 
Materials Control Programs. 
5. Internal Review Office (00300) 
The Internal Review Office administers the internal audit service for the 
command to ensure integrity of existing systems, methods, and procedures. 
They are responsible for analyzing the cost accounting system to assure proper 
classification, presentation and processing cost control information into the 
Financial Management Program for the facility. 
6. Aviation Safety Officer (00200) 
The Aviation Safety Officer serves as staff advisor to the CO and is 
charged with developing ·and implementing a comprehensive aviation safety 
program within the depot 
7. Total Quality Management Program Office (00100) 
The Total Quality Management Program Office coordinates and manages 
the implementation of the total quality management (TQM) throughout the 
depot. 
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8. Deputy Equal Employment Opportunity Officer (01300) 
The DEEOO advises and educates management on methods of addressing 
system barriers, identifying potential problems, analyzing the impact of agency 
policy, and applying motivational techniques which improve EEO attainment 
through job structuring, promotions, training, etc. 
9. Public Affairs Officer (00400) 
The Public Affairs Officer serves as advisor to the CO in relationships 
with civic groups and external industrial professional and government 
organizations. They coordinate both an internal and external communication 
systems to keep employees and outside organizations informed of activities and 
special events. 
10. Security Director (093) 
The Security Director manages the security programs for the depot 
including classification management, coordinating physical security with the 
host air station, personnel and ADP security, and education and training of 
employees on security matters. 
11. Civilian Personnel Officer (01200) 
The Civilian Personnel Officer (CPO) of the air station is designated as 
CPO for the depot on a collateral basis. The CPO provides comprehensive 
civilian personnel staff services to all elements of the depot and serves as 
consultant to top management on matters affecting civilian personnel 
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administration. 
U. Director of Quality (03) 
The Director of Quality oversees and coordinates the efforts of the Quality 
and Reliability Assurance (Q&RA) Department (34) and the Flight Check 
Department (38). 
a. Q&RA Department 
The Q&RA Department is the focal point for technology advances 
and continual improvement in quality. They assure low variability in 
production of quality products and service by evaluating and determining the 
capability of systems and processes. 
b. Flight Check Department (38) 
The Flight Check Department coordinates all aspects of the 
functional check flight program. 
13. Director of Operations (04) 
The Director of Operations advises the CO on production management 
issues and exercises operational oversight of the Production Planning 
Department (45), Production Engineering Department (46), and the Production 
Department (49). The operations director recommends changes in policy and 
procedures which will improve the effectiveness of production operations. 
a. Production Planning Department (45) 
The Production Planning Department carries out the production 
132 
planning, schedule and control program encompassing the total production 
assignments of the depot In addition to their daily relations with the 
production departmenf s operations, the production planning department plays 
a significant role in improving systems and management controls. 
b. Production Engineering Department (46) 
The Production Engineering Department determines processing 
batch sizes to achieve optimum sequence of operations and any special tooling 
and equipment requirements then provides the Production Planning 
Department the necessary data for use in establishing workload commitments 
and production schedules. 
c. Production Department (49) 
The Production Department controls the daily workload and 
schedule assigned to the depot All other departments exist to support the 
production effort in producing products of acceptable quality on schedule at 
minimum cost 
14. Director of Product Support (05) 
The Director of Product Support oversees the efforts of the Product 
Support Directorate (PSD) (53), the Deputy Weapons System Manager (WSM) 
(55), and the Fleet Readiness Action Group (56). 
a. Product Support Directorate (53) 
The Product Support Directorate keeps the entire maintenance, 
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logistics, and modification program in balance so as to maximize readiness and 
achieve the most efficient use of resources. They have design and maintenance 
engineering cognizance of assigned weapon systems and equipment and 
provide worldwide engineering support for designated systems, components, 
and equipment. 
b. Deputy Weapon Systems Manager (55) 
The WSM performs management and integration of the material 
acquisition and logistics support functions for the total aircraft or weapons 
systems. The WSM has a direct channel to COMNAVAIRSYSCOM and other 
commands to accomplish orderly and timely weapons systems management 
functions. 
c. Fleet Readiness Action Group (56) 
The FRAG is a functional unit within the DEPOT that assists in 
resolving COMNA V AIRSYSCOM, Navy Supply, and fleet operating squadrons 
support problems relating to maintenance and supply. 
15. Director of Resources/Comptroller (08) 
The Director of Resources/Comptroller advises the CO on matters 
concerning material management and administrative services and recommends 
changes in policy and procedures which will improve its effectiveness. The 
Director of Resources/Comptroller manages the operations of the 
Administrative Services Department, the Management Control Department, the 
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Business Office, and the Material Department 
a. Administrative Services Deparbnent (81) 
The Administrative Services Department serves as an integrating 
force throughout the depot by providing administrative office and personnel 
support services and other functions not performed or provided by the host air 
station. 
b. Management Control Department (82) 
The Management Control Department aides the CO and his staff in 
planning for and use of money, manpower, material and facilities in support of 
assigned programs and tasks. They provide the needed training, coordination, 
and project execution for documentation of all realized cost reductions. 
c. Business Office (84) 
Strategic and Business Planning are the two predominate functions 
of the Business Office. They are the primary focal point in assessing the future 
shape of depot maintenance, developing business strategies and instituting 
tactical plans to achieve long range strategic objectives. 
~ Mat~lDepartment~n 
The Material Department is responsible for the acquisition, receipt, 
distribution, storage, issuing, inventory control and analysis, excessing, and 




·NAVY MAINTENANCE AUTOMATED INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
SYSTEM ACRONYM PROGRAM RESOURCE 
SPONSOR SPONSOR 
Automated Technical ATIS SEA04 N865, N871, 
Information Support System N885 
AUTOSPEC Users System AUS SEA071 N43, N881, 
AIR3.0 N87 
Baseline Advanced Industrial BAlM ·N43 DUSD(L) 
Management 
Calibration Recall Information CRIS SEA04 N43 
System 
Computer Aided Design 2 CAD-2 SEA071 
AIR3.0 
Executive Information System EIS JLSC DUSD(L) 
Facilities Equipment FEM JLSC DUSD(L) 
Maintenance 
Fleet Modernization Program FMPMIS SEA04 N43 
Management Information System 
Hazardous Material IDviMS JISC DUSD(L) 
Management System 
Interservice Material Accounting IMACS JLSC DUSD(L) 
Computer System 
Integrated Condition Assessment ICAS N43 N88, N86, 
System N853 
Joint Computer-aided JCALS N43 N43, 
Acquisition and Logistics DUSD(L) 
Support 
Joint Engineering Data JEDMICS N43 N43, 
Management Information and DUSD(L) 
Control System 
Laboratory Information LIMS JLSC DUSD(L) 
Management System 
Maintenance Resource MRMS-IMA N43 N62 
Management System IMA 
Maintenance Resource MRMS-TRC N43 N62 
Management System TYCOM 
Representative Component 
Manufacturing Resource MRPII JLSC DUSD (L) 
Planning II 
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Naval Aviation Logistics NALCOMIS N881 N62 
Management Information System 
Open Architectural Retrieval OARS SEA04 N43 
System 
Organizational Maintenance OMMS N43 N62 
Management System 
Programmed Depot Maintenance PDMSS N43 DUSD(L) 
Scheduling System 
Shipboard Uniform Automated SUADPS N41 N62 
Data Processing System 
· Ship Configuration and Logistics SCLSIS SEA04 N43 
Sl!Pport Information System 
Shipboard Non-Tactical ADP SNAP SEA04 N62 
Program 
· Total Availability Management TAMS SEA04, SEA N43, N881, 
System 07, AIR 6.0 N87 
Trident Logistics Data System- Trident LDS- N87 N87 
Planned Maintenance PMMS 
Management System 
Trident Logistics Data System- Trident LDS- N87 N87 
Refit Maintenance Management RMMS 
System 
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AIMD NORTH ISLAND CALIBRATION LABORATORY 
CHAIN OF COMMAND 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
Authorized Allowance 
Aircraft 
Authorized Accounting Activity 
Aircraft Controlling Custodian 
Aircraft 
All-Weather Carrier Landing System 
Allowance Change Request 
Aircraft Discrepancy Book 
Automated Data Processing 
Aircraft Engine Management System 
Aeronautical Equipment Service Record 
Airframe Bulletin 
Airframe Change 
Aviation Fleet Maintenance 
Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department 
Aircraft Inventory Record 
Air Force Pacific 
Aircraft Inventory Reporting System 
Automated Information System 
Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment 
Aircraft Material Readiness Report 
Aircraft Maintenance Material Readiness List 
Aeronautical Material Screening Unit 
American National Standards Institute 
Aviation Electronics Technician 
Action Taken Code 
Activity Tool Control System 
Automated Test Equipment 
Aviation Training Support System 
Aviation Consolidated Allowance List 
Aviation Depot Level Repairable 
Awaiting Maintenance 
Awaiting Parts 
Beyond Capability of Maintenance 
Bureau Number 
Carrier Air Group 
Calibration Standards Allowance Requirements 
Collateral Duty Inspector 
Cognizant Field Activity 














































Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet 
Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet 
Commander, Naval Reserve Force 
Commander, Naval Air Training 
Chief of Naval Education and Training 
Chief of Naval Operations 
Carrier Onboard Delivery 
Communications Security 
Communications Station 
Commander Submarine Force Pacific 
Continental United States 
Consolidated Remain-In-Place List 
Calibration Problem Reports 
Computer Resources Integrated Support 
Combat Systems Manager 
Department of Defense 
Depot Level Repairable 
Designated Overhaul Point 
Data Services Facility 
Designated Support Point 
Engineering Change Proposal 
Electrostatic Discharge 
Estimated 
Engine Transaction Report 
Engineering and Technical Services 
Expeditious Repair 
Field Calibration Activities 
Functional Check Flight 
Family Group Code 
Field Level Repairable 
Full Mission Capable 
Fleet Marine Force 
Fleet Maintenance Officer 
Foreign Object Damage 
Fleet Readiness Aviation Maintenance Personnel 
Fleet Readiness Training 
Federal Supply Code for Manufactures 
Fleet Technical Support Center Atlantic 
Fleet Technical Support Center Pacific 
Fiscal Year 
General Purpose Electronic Test Equipment 
Hazardous Material 












































Individual Component Repair List 
Integrated Logistic Support 
Integrated Logistic Support Plan 
Integrated Logistic Support Management Team 
Intermediate Maintenance 
Intermediate Maintenance Activity Coordination 
Center 
Individual Material Readiness List 
Illustrated Parts Breakdown 
Interim Rapid Action Change 
Jet Blast Deflector 
Job Control Number 
Joint Oil Analysis Program 
Light Airborne Multi-purpose System 
Life Cycle Management 
Local Calibration Procedure 
List of Items Requiring Special Handling 
Liquid Oxygen 
Local Repair Cycle Asset 
Maintenance Action Form 
Marine Aircraft Group 
Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 
Maintenance Assist Module 
Measure Assurance Program 
Marine Aircraft Wing 
Maintenance Data Report(ing) 
Maintenance Data System 
Metrology Automated System for Uniform Recall and 
Reporting 
Mission Essential Subsystem Matrix 
Metrology and Calibration 
Metrology Equipment List 
Metrology Requirements List 
Maintenance Instruction 
Mechanical Instrument Repair and Calibration Shop 
Management Information System 
Maintenance Material Control Officer 
Maintenance Officer 
Memorandum of Agreement 
MEASURE Operational Control Center 
Master Repairable Item List 
Maintenance Training hnprovement Program 
Marine Wing Support Group 












































Naval Aviation Depot Operations Center 
Naval Aviation Engineering Service 
Naval Aviation Logistic Command Management 
Information System 
Naval Aviation Maintenance Discrepancy Reporting 
Program 
Naval Air Station 
Naval Air Systems Command 
Naval Communications Station 
Naval Facility 
Naval Radio Station 
Naval Sea Systems Command 
Naval Shipyard Puget Sound 
Naval Station 
Naval Telecommunications 
Navy Calibration Laboratory 
Nondestructive Inspection 
Navy Enlisted Oassification 
Navy Engineering Technical Services 
National Item Identification Number 
Not Mission Capable 
Not Mission Capable Maintenance 
Not Mission Capable Supply 
Navy Oil Analysis Program 
Not Operationally Ready Supply 
Naval Submarine Base 
Naval Surface Warfare Center 
Navy Training Plan 
Naval Transmitter Radio Facility 
Naval Undersea Warfare Center Division, Keyport 
Naval Warfare Assessment Division 
Naval Weapons Station 
Ocean Engineering 
On-the-Job Training 
Organizational Maintenance Activity 
Operations Maintenance Division 
Out-of-Tolerance 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
Operating Target 
Organizational Code 



















































Naval Post Graduate School 
Prime Intermediate Maintenance Activity 
Partial Mission Capable 
Partial Mission Capable Maintenance 
Partial Mission Capable Supply 
Precision Measuring Equipment 
Plan of Action and Milestones 
Point of Contact 
Power Plants Bulletin 




Quality Assurance Representative 
Quality Deficiency Report 
Quick Engine Change 
Quick Engine Change Assembly 
Quick Engine Change Kit 
Quick Engine Change Stand 
Radiation Control 
Radiation Detection, Indication, and Computation 
Repair and Return 
Replacement Air Group 
Random Access Memory 
Rapid Action Maintenance Engineering Change 
Ready For Issue 
Ready For Use 
Remain In Place 
Regional Maintenance Center 
Regional Repair Center 
Subsystem Capability and Impact 
Ships Configuration and Logistics Support 
Information System 
Standard Depot Level Maintenance 
Support Equipment 
Support Equipment Controlling Activity 
Support Equipment Resources Management 
Information System 
Serial Number 










































Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity 
Ship Manning Document 
Source, Maintenance and Recoverability Code 
Special Material Identification Code 
Squadron 
Squadron Manning Document 
Shop Replaceable Assembly 
Scheduled Removal Component 
Supply Support Center 
Strategic Systems Programs 
Submarine Base 
Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet 
Submarine Safe 
Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet 
Strategic Weapons Facility, Pacific 
Ship Yard 
Systems Command 
Test & Measuring Equipment 
Test and Monitoring Systems 
Technical Awareness Program 
Turn Around Time 
Test Bench Installation 
Technical Directive 
Technical Directive Change 
Type Equipment Code 
Tailored Outfitting Listing 
Technical Publications Deficiency Report 
Technical Publications Library 
Trident Refit Facility 
Trident Planned Equipment Replacement 
Trident Training Facility 
Technical Services Building 
Type Commander 
Uniform Material Movement and Issue Priority 
System 
Versatile Avionics Shop Test 
Visual Information Display System 
Weapons Station 
Weapons Replaceable Assembly 
Work Unit Code 
Aviation Maintenance Material Management 
(NAMP) 
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